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Over the past decade, Russia’s reemergence on the international stage has been 
accompanied by a more aggressive foreign policy agenda. This confrontational Russian 
behavior lends itself to the conduct of a case study of the international relations theory 
known as realism. This thesis analyzes Russian decision making on strategic missile 
defense and nuclear arms control from a realist perspective. Russia’s policies appear to be 
shaped by realist principles such as zero-sum calculations, the existence of an anarchic 
international system, and the continuing attempts to alter the balance of power to 
Moscow’s advantage. Moscow holds that U.S.-led ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
efforts could not only neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent, but upset strategic stability. 
Russia’s nuclear weapons serve a critical deterrent role and fulfill political purposes, so 
Moscow is highly resistant to nuclear arms reductions beyond those specified in the 2010 
New START Treaty. Russia even seeks to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal, but 
it will be constrained by economic realities. Despite these constraints, Russia’s great 
power ambitions hold potential security risks for NATO countries. 
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The United States and Russia have a history of both cooperation and conflict in 
the areas of strategic missile defense and nuclear arms control. The decades of the Cold 
War were interwoven with periods of détente and rising tensions, remarkable political 
cooperation and frustrating diplomatic efforts. This turbulent trend appears to have 
continued even after the collapse of the Soviet empire. Despite a nuclear and 
conventional arms race, the USSR and the United States signed landmark agreements, 
including the SALT, INF, and START treaties. These two titans even managed to sign 
the ABM Treaty in 1972—a treaty that many Americans interpreted as a pact designed to 
ensure mutual vulnerability. In the wake of the withdrawal of the United States from the 
ABM Treaty in 2002, coupled with Russia’s fall from great power status and advances in 
missile defense technology, political tensions have risen yet again. Russia is afraid of the 
newest iteration of U.S. missile defense plans, notably the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA), which is the U.S. contribution to NATO’s strategic missile defense 
effort. U.S.-Russian talks on missile defense and nuclear arms control have stalled since 
the signature of the New START Treaty in April 2010. The Russians have also expressed 
threats regarding U.S. and NATO missile defense efforts, apparently due to 
misperceptions and distrust of the United States and its NATO allies. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What is the analytical framework that shapes Russian decision-making on 
strategic missile defense and nuclear arms control? This thesis will analyze the 
interactions between Russia and the United States in these contentious areas using a 
realist lens, focusing on the Russian perspective since 2002, when the U.S. withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty took effect. The thesis will examine the issues by taking a state-
centric realist approach in which Russia acts for the preservation of its security and in 
line with its national interests. This approach will, it is hoped, determine whether this 
Russian behavior is rational from a realist perspective. Is Russia portraying U.S. and 
NATO missile defense efforts as a threat to its national security in order to gain strategic 
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concessions in nuclear arms control negotiations with the United States? Moscow claims 
that a U.S.-led NATO missile defense shield would threaten Russian strategic nuclear 
deterrence. Is this an actual fear or a feigned panic being used as an instrument of 
manipulation?  
This thesis will also review some assessments of the rationality of the Russian 
fears of U.S. and NATO missile defense efforts using a technical capabilities-based 
approach. This objective analysis of U.S. and NATO BMD prospects and Russian missile 
programs will assess the validity of Russian concerns. Are the Russian concerns that the 
United States and its NATO allies could upset the strategic balance justified? Could U.S.-
led missile defense programs undermine strategic stability? If the Russian fear of the 
U.S.-led BMD program is irrational and not grounded in an objective assessment of the 
program’s potential capabilities, other geopolitical concerns are the likely drivers of 
Russia’s foreign policy behavior. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Despite the supposed “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations announced in 2009 by the 
Obama administration, Russia has taken every opportunity to gain strategic concessions 
from the United States.1 Russia has a zero-sum game mindset in international politics, so 
its foreign policy is oriented in terms of geopolitical competition. Its goal is to maximize 
its own power while minimizing American strength and influence. The issues of missile 
defense and nuclear arms control are no exception. Although missile defense has become 
a NATO priority, Russia views NATO as no more than a tool to further U.S. foreign 
policy.2 In 2012, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, now the President of the Russian 
Federation, stated, “Today, NATO is more a foreign policy tool than a military bloc. The 
United States is using NATO primarily as a tool to preserve its leadership within the 
1 Janusz Bugajski, Georgian Lessons: Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in the Wider Europe 
(Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 6. 




                                                 
Western community.”3 NATO efforts to bolster missile defense capabilities are seen as 
primarily a U.S.-led endeavor. This is an important distinction because this thesis focuses 
mainly on the bilateral interactions between Russia and the United States, though 
NATO’s role is still vital. A comprehensive understanding of Russian decision-making 
may enable policymakers to anticipate future Russian reactions to U.S. and NATO 
initiatives.  
Analyses of Russian behavior are still relevant after the end of the Cold War 
because it is important for U.S. policymakers to understand the decision-making of one 
of the world’s leading nuclear powers. The United States observed in its 2010 National 
Security Strategy that Russia is one of the “key centers of influence”4 in the 21st century, 
and that it has “reemerged in the international arena as a strong voice.”5 Even if Russia is 
not at the center of U.S. foreign policy, it should be a priority for America to understand a 
geopolitical rival, especially in light of the recent military aggression in Georgia in 2008 
and Ukraine in 2014. 
C. HYPOTHESES   
The research question has the potential to spawn several hypotheses to account for 
Russian behavior. The analytical framework that shapes Russian decision making could 
consist of entirely realist reasons. A realist oriented hypothesis could be framed as 
follows: The principal features of realism, including the anarchic state of the international 
system, the importance of relative power calculations, and the competition for state 
survival and aggrandizement, shape Russian decision making on strategic missile defense 
and nuclear arms control. A second possibility is that realist factors fail to fully account 
for Russian behavior in these areas, in which case this thesis would differentiate between 
the areas where realism does or does not apply. Another possible conclusion is that no 
3 “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Meets with Experts in Sarov,” Archive of the Official Site of the 
2008–2012 Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, February 24, 2012, 
http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18248/. 
4 United States National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 3, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
5 Ibid., 8.  
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Russian views can be explained by realism, in which case the null hypothesis would be 
assessed: that is, that realist theories fail to explain Russian behavior in strategic missile 
defense and nuclear arms control. 
 Liberal institutional incentives, domestic politics, attributed social meanings, and 
historically defined state identities could also account for Russian foreign policy 
decisions, but these are beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis does not intend to 
cover the entire spectrum of international relations theory. Realism offers a plausible 
interpretation that deserves investigation. While other schools of international relations 
theory, such as liberalism and constructivism, may have noteworthy arguments, realism 
appears to have the most explanatory power. This thesis will assess to what extent the 
realist school of thought in international relations theory explains Russian decision 
making on strategic missile defense and nuclear arms control. Russia seems to be driven 
primarily by power ambitions while security concerns complicate the pursuit of those 
goals. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is vast scholarship on U.S.-Russia relations, missile defense, and arms 
control, but authors writing about these issues in the post-Cold War era rarely use 
theories of international relations. Researchers occasionally apply realist arguments, but 
they do not name theories directly and do not develop those arguments along theoretical 
lines. There is an abundance of international relations theories and variants of each, but 
this thesis does not intend to explore every derivative of realism. 
Morgenthau is one of the prominent contemporary expositors of realism, and his 
book, Politics Among Nations, describes the classic theory of political realism. His book 
covers a myriad of causal relationships, but Morgenthau makes the basic argument that 
“International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.”6 Power and—more 
importantly—the balance of power stand at the heart of Morgenthau’s examination. 
6 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), 25. 
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States are the primary actors in international politics. From this perspective, studying the 
motives and ideas of individuals does little to further the understanding of international 
relations.  
Kenneth Waltz, another realist scholar, wrote Theory of International Politics, in 
which he sets out a theory of international relations termed structural realism. As with 
Morgenthau, power is central to Waltz’s realist analysis. Waltz approaches international 
relations by focusing on the structure of relations among states, rather than on any 
individual state or its constituent individuals. According to Waltz, there are three 
principles that define a political structure: the organization of the system, the character of 
the units (states), and the distribution of capabilities across those units.7  He is concerned 
with the effect systemic pressures have on countries’ foreign policies.  
John Mearsheimer, yet another realist thinker, wrote The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics, in which he presents a theory of international relations known as offensive 
realism. This theory follows most of the realist tenets laid down by Morgenthau and 
Waltz, with some exceptions. According to offensive realism, great powers seek to 
maximize their share of world power by striving for regional and eventually global 
hegemony because survival is only guaranteed by being the most powerful actor in the 
system.8 Mearsheimer measures power in terms of material capabilities, rather than 
influence; however, he makes a distinction between military and latent power. Latent 
power is based on a country’s population and wealth, and ample latent power is a 
necessary precursor to military power. Mearsheimer has clear assumptions and lays out 
causal relationships. He is also working with a small set of cases (only great powers), 
from which he derives his theory.  
Experts on U.S.-Russian interactions tend to agree that current relations 
concerning missile defense and nuclear arms control are strained at best. Bugajski, 
Tsygankov, and Kipp hold that Russia claims to be a great power, seeks to diminish 
7 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979), 82.  




                                                 
American influence, and promote a more multipolar world.9 This might be based on 
Medvedev’s August 2008 interview outlining his five foreign policy principles.10 As 
Schroder, Dimitrakopoulou, and Liaropoulos note, Russia’s 2009 National Security 
Strategy includes a claim to be a hegemonic power in the post-Soviet space.11 Many 
Russians hold that a comprehensive U.S. missile defense system would impede Russia’s 
great power ambitions. Coyle and Samson, however, argue that the current state of 
technology renders the U.S. BMD program almost useless and undoubtedly ineffective 
against basic missile attacks, let alone complex ICBMs with decoy systems.12 This 
implies that the Russian fear of the U.S. BMD program is objectively unfounded. 
Furthermore, Coyle and Samson argue that U.S. BMD plans in Europe continue to strain 
U.S. relations with Russia without providing tangible positive results.  
The following scholars represent some of the prevailing views on missile defense 
and nuclear arms control, and they generally approach the issues from a policy analysis 
or a historical perspective. 
Jeffrey Mankoff’s article, “The Politics of U.S. Missile Defense Cooperation with 
Europe and Russia,” highlights some Russian concerns about the U.S.-led missile defense 
efforts. He notes that the Russians viewed the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as 
undermining strategic stability and states that this act would “weaken one of the few 
9 Janusz Bugajski, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialism,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 4, 
no. 1 (Winter 2010): 5; Andrei Tsygankov, “Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russia’s Grand 
Strategy,” Problems of Post-Communism 58, no. 2 (2011): 28; Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia as a Nuclear Power 
in the Eurasian Context,” in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic 
Asia 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age (Seattle and Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2013), 56. 
10 “Interview Given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One, Rossia, NTV,” 
President of Russia, August 31, 2008, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml.  
11 Henning Schroder, “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020,” Russian Analytical Digest, no.62 
(June 18, 2009): 6; Sophia Dimitrakopoulou and Andrew Liaropoulos, “Russia’s National Security Strategy 
to 2020: A Great Power in the Making?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 4, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 
35. 
12 Philip Coyle and Victoria Samson, “Missile Defense Malfunction: Why the Proposed U.S. Missile 




                                                 
remaining bases on which Russia could claim major power status.”13 He also points out 
that the Russians feared Phase 4 of the EPAA because this phase was specifically 
designed to shoot down ICBMs, which are the backbone of the Russian strategic nuclear 
deterrent.14 Although the U.S. government cancelled Phase 4 in March 2013, Russia still 
worries that a future U.S. administration could build upon the proposed BMD system. 
While the United States has repeatedly stated that Russian ICBMs are not in danger, the 
Russian general staff and military commanders, who have been gaining influence in 
missile defense discussions, are skeptical of U.S. assurances about U.S. BMD 
capabilities.15 Mankoff’s own views reflect skepticism about the probable technical 
performance capabilities of U.S. BMD. In his own words, “Notwithstanding the Obama 
administration’s stated confidence in the SM-3 missile and the Aegis cruiser, the 
technology remains unproven and expensive.”16  
Janusz Bugajski argues that the Russians use the U.S.-proposed missile defense 
shield in Europe as a pawn in “security chess,” and that they use the supposed threat to 
Russia’s national security as a means to gain concessions.17 Russia views security in 
terms of zero-sum calculations, so gains made by the United States in European security 
matters are seen as setbacks for Russia’s own defense. Therefore, one of Russia’s 
fundamental goals is to undermine the role of the United States in the European security 
architecture by impeding the pursuit of U.S. and NATO missile defense plans. This goal 
is a part of a broader effort to transform Europe into “an appendage of the Russian sphere 
of influence” and undercut “Europe’s connections with the United States.”18 Russia acts 
aggressively in order to gain concessions, and weak Western responses only encourage 
further aggressive foreign policy behavior by Moscow. 
13 Jeffrey Mankoff, “The Politics of U.S. Missile Defense Cooperation with Europe and Russia,” 
International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012): 334. 
14 Ibid., 340. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 344. 
17 Bugajski, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialism,” 13. 
18 Ibid., 7. 
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Jacob Kipp’s study, “Russia as a Nuclear Power in the Eurasian Context,” 
describes the role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s security and the implications for 
geopolitics due to Russia’s nuclear policies. He approaches the issue from a historical 
perspective and outlines how the Soviet nuclear inheritance has shaped Russian security 
strategy. Currently, Russia relies heavily on nuclear weapons for deterrence because of 
the poor condition of its conventional military forces. Nuclear weapons, including non-
strategic nuclear weapons, are considered to be essential for maintaining strategic 
stability. Since the 2010 New START Treaty, U.S.-Russian discussions on nuclear arms 
control appear to have come to a halt. Russia does not seem to desire any cuts in its 
nuclear weapons. Additionally, Russia’s distinctive geopolitical position and 
conventional military deficiencies have expanded the role of nuclear weapons to be able 
to respond to a variety of possible contingencies. Kipp foresees difficulty in any future 
cooperation between the United States and Russia: the optimism arising from the 2009 
“reset” has faded.19 
Pavel Podvig’s analysis, “Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and 
Modernization,” emphasizes the focus of the current Russian nuclear policy. He also 
explains the Russian emphasis on the link between offensive and defensive capabilities. 
Maintaining the strategic balance with the United States is still considered to be essential 
for protecting Russia’s national security.20 The Russian emphasis on strategic stability 
was evident in the important role that Russia attributed to arms control agreements with 
the United States.21 According to Podvig, Russia believes that the purpose of the U.S. 
BMD program is to undermine its nuclear deterrent.22 BMD would “undermine the 
strategic balance that exists between the offensive forces of the two countries,” so Russia 
desires legal limits on defensive capabilities in addition to offensive forces.23 The 
19 Kipp, “Russia as a Nuclear Power.” 
20 Pavel Podvig, “Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization,” Proliferation 
Papers 37, (Spring 2011): 7. 
21 Ibid. 




                                                 
preamble of the New START Treaty contains a statement acknowledging the link 
between offensive and defensive forces, but Podvig holds that missile defenses would not 
threaten offensive forces, “even at very low levels of offensive forces.”24 
 Problems and Prospects of Russia’s Cooperation with U.S./NATO in the Field of 
Missile Defense is a Russian report prepared by various defense experts and specialists in 
national and international security. The report analyzes the political and military spheres 
of missile defense issues while also examining from a technical perspective interceptors 
and related technology. The authors advocate greater cooperation between Russia and the 
United States as in the best interest of both parties. They conclude that Moscow is 
justified in seeking legal constraints guaranteeing the non-targeting of Russian systems,25 
though the threat posed by the EPAA to Russia’s strategic deterrent is limited.26 There is 
potential for cooperation, but both sides must overcome decades of mistrust. 
Mikhail Tsypkin’s article, “Russia, America, and Missile Defense,” discusses 
cultural aspects in addition to the political and strategic considerations raised by missile 
defense issues. According to Tsypkin, the negative response to U.S. missile defense is 
due primarily to political and cultural reasons, while technical concerns are secondary.27 
Tsypkin highlights the history of Soviet threat inflation, as well as the effects on Russian 
threat perceptions of the U.S.-led BMD program due to a history of backwardness.28 The 
Russians want a place in the European security system due to their identity as 
Europeans,29 not simply to exert influence over Europe’s defense architecture. Tsypkin 
argues that Russian culture, shared experiences, and even business interests seem to 
24 Podvig, “Russia’s Nuclear Forces,” 20. 
25 V. I. Trubnikov et al., Problems and Prospects of Russia’s Cooperation with U.S./NATO in the 
Field of Missile Defense (Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations Russian 
Academy of Sciences, 2011), 15. 
26 Ibid., 18. 
27 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russia, America, and Missile Defense,” Defense and Security Analysis 28, no. 1 
(2012): 56. 
28 Ibid., 57–58. 
29 Ibid., 61. 
9 
 
                                                 
shape leaders’ foreign policy decisions. In other words, factors in addition to the 
competitive power considerations in realism deserve attention. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis presents the issues of strategic missile defense and nuclear arms 
control as two case studies of the broader phenomenon of Russia’s foreign policy 
behavior. This examination of the analytical framework that shapes Russian decision 
making contains, it is hoped, some external validity in showing that missile defense and 
nuclear arms control are just two aspects of more general behavior recently exhibited by 
the Russian Federation. The findings may then be applied to Russia’s behavior in other 
spheres. The basic analytical approach of this thesis is historical and qualitative, rather 
than statistical and quantitative in nature. 
In addition to scholarly secondary sources, this thesis relies on a variety of 
primary source materials. These sources include government documents originating from 
both Washington and Moscow, as well as briefings, conferences, and official statements 
from government agencies. This thesis also analyzes the views of prominent government 
officials who are likely to influence state policy, such as heads of state and government, 
influential military commanders, and representatives of government agencies. The 
Medvedev and Putin administrations produced a few policy documents that provide some 
insight into the mentality of Russian elites: the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation, the 2009 National Security Strategy until 2020, and the two most 
recent military doctrines of the Russian Federation. Additionally, the U.S. Missile 
Defense Agency has published reports and held several briefings in Moscow on the 
technical aspects of the BMD program.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized in five chapters: this introduction, strategic missile 
defense, nuclear arms control, a review of assessments of U.S. and Russian capabilities, 
notably in relation to strategic stability, and a conclusion describing some of the security 
implications for the United States and its NATO allies. This thesis examines realism’s 
10 
 
applications to strategic missile defense and nuclear arms control before assessing 
Russia’s nuclear capabilities with respect to U.S. missile defenses. Missile defense is 
discussed first because Moscow’s strategic planners have always regarded strategic BMD 
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II. STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
U.S.-Russia relations over strategic missile defense have a rocky history grounded 
in fear and mistrust. These difficulties date back to the Cold War, and recent events have 
not relieved tensions. The United States seeks to build a ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
system in Europe, as its contribution to a NATO missile defense architecture, while 
Russia has done everything in its power to stop its deployment or at the very least shape 
the conditions of its development on terms favorable to the Kremlin. President George 
W. Bush’s proposed “third site” was seen as a threat, and President Obama’s proposed 
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) has, in Russian eyes, the potential to be 
even more of a danger. Russia has responded aggressively for the most part, at one point 
threatening a preemptive strike against these missile defense facilities in Europe should 
the situation deteriorate.30    
Russia’s behavior raises the age old question of how countries make foreign 
policy decisions. Realism, a well-known theory of international relations, has great 
explanatory power in this situation. The core concepts presented under the light of realist 
theories illuminate Russia’s actions in response to U.S.-led missile defense efforts as a 
series of carefully calculated political maneuvers. 
A. GREAT POWER AMBITIONS 
Russia claims to be a great power and an influential actor in international politics. 
In terms of a purely military definition, there can be no denying this assertion. In John 
Mearsheimer’s view, military means are all that matter in determining great power status 
because great powers only need to be able to put up a fight against the most powerful 
state in the system.31 The sheer number of nuclear weapons Russia possesses is enough to 
substantiate this claim. Mark Schneider believes these weapons to be the only validation 
of Russia’s great power standing: “Today the only basis for Russia’s claims to world 
30 “Russia Warns on Missile Defence Deal with NATO and US,” BBC, May 3, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17937795.    
31 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 5. 
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power status is its nuclear capability.”32  The distinction of Russia being a great power is 
relevant to realism because it is appropriately subject to Mearsheimer’s theory of 
offensive realism. Russia may also be viewed through the lens of Morgenthau’s political 
realism because Russia is actively involved in international political struggles that, 
according to Morgenthau, are driven by power considerations by their very nature.33 
Russia, like every state seeking to thrive in the international arena, is motivated by power 
politics. 
1. Multipolarity 
Russia has not only stated on multiple occasions that it is a great power, but that it 
will also become “a full-fledged member of a multipolar international order.”34 Russia 
seeks to replace a U.S.-dominated unipolar world in favor of multipolarity with Russia 
playing an important role in global politics.35 This is not to say that Russia favors 
multilateralism because it would rather enhance its own power, free of being checked by 
smaller countries in international organizations.36 Russia is clearly unsatisfied with the 
status quo balance of power and is eager to tip the scales in its favor. Recent government 
statements express these desires. Russia’s 2008 Foreign Policy Concept states that Russia 
will defend its own national interests instead of acquiescing to the desires of other states, 
acting unilaterally if necessary.37 Also, Dimitri Medvedev, then the President of Russia, 
stated in an interview with a Russian news channel in 2008 that one of his foreign and 
security policy principles is that “the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is 
unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow,” and he specifically mentioned 
the United States.38 U.S. strategic missile defense is regarded as a major roadblock 
32 Mark Schneider, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation, United States 
Nuclear Strategy Forum (Washington, DC: National Institute Press 2006), 4. 
33 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 26. 
34 Tsygankov, “Preserving Influence,” 28. 
35 Bugajski, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialism,” 5. 
36 Ibid. 
37 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, President of Russia: Official Web Portal, 
July 12, 2008, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml. 
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impeding Russia’s great power ambitions. Russia’s stance on missile defense is simply a 
means to an end. It is one of the ways for Russia to demand respect and legitimacy. 
2. Anarchy 
Russia sees an anarchic, unipolar world in which the United States clutches onto 
its own power while subverting Russia’s interests. A core assumption of realism is that 
the international system exists in relative anarchy, which is an ordering principle stating 
that there is no ruling body higher than the states.39 Anarchy promotes a “self-help” 
environment where states must help themselves because there is no higher authority to 
come to their aid.40 Sergei Karaganov supports the belief that states exist in anarchy even 
in a nuclear world and “argues that states must act in their own interests in the absence of 
an international regime preventing the intervention of other powers.”41 From Russia’s 
point of view, the United States is building missile defense systems not only to 
supposedly secure Europe from threats from Iran and other “rogue states,” but also to 
keep Russia out of Europe both politically and militarily. 
B. SURVIVAL 
These perceived U.S. attempts at distancing Russia from Europe are seen as a 
precursor to a developing security threat. One principle of realism is that survival is the 
primary goal of the state.42 Russia, first and foremost, acts to preserve its very existence. 
Missile defense is regarded as a threat to Russia’s national security and the strategic 
balance, or at least is so portrayed by the Kremlin. Vladimir Putin voiced his concern in 
2012, stating that “in our view, an attempt is being made to destabilize that balance and to 
create a survivability monopoly in their favor.”43 In April 2013, Yuri Baluevsky, former 
38 “Interview Given by Dmitry Medvedev.” 
39 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 30. 
40 Ibid., 33. 
41 Sergei Karaganov, “Global Zero and Common Sense,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2 (2010): 28, 
cited in Kipp, “Russia as a Nuclear Power,” 46. 
42 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 31. 
43 “Putin Meets with Experts in Sarov.” 
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chief of the general staff and a member of the Russian Security Council, went so far as to 
say that the United States is preparing for a “first nuclear strike on Russia and China” by 
building a global missile defense system to reduce their retaliatory strike capability to one 
hundred missiles.44 In general, Russia puts forth the argument that the EPAA is aimed at 
containing Russia because (Moscow asserts) there are no other threats for such a system 
to counter. From the Russian perspective, the United States deliberately exaggerates the 
threat of the proliferation of ballistic missile technology to mask its pursuit of capabilities 
that could be used against Russia and China.  
Officially, missile threats from rogue states such as Iran lie at the heart of the 
United States’ concerns; however, a 2009 joint independent assessment by American and 
Russian technical experts stated that the Iranian threat “is not imminent… and the system 
currently proposed would not be effective against it.”45 Although one argument of 
Russian elites is that there is no immediate threat of ballistic missiles from the Middle 
East, the United States is planning for future capabilities. Even Russian experts note that 
“it would be a gross strategic miscalculation to start designing these systems after the 
emergence of a real missile threat.”46 Russian leaders must be aware of the fact that it 
would already be too late for a country to start preparing for a threat after the threat has 
materialized, especially if the development of these defensive capabilities would take 
years. Although the Russian argument about the rogue state threat may be invalid, the 
Russian rhetoric still follows a key realist tenet: state survival is paramount. 
1. Intentions 
Even if Iranian missiles are the source of U.S. defensive intentions, Russia 
behaves in the manner of a great power, and “great powers balance against capabilities, 
not intentions.”47 Another realist assumption is that states can never be one hundred 
44 Kipp, “Russia as a Nuclear Power,” 53. 
45 “Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical 
Experts,” East–West Institute, May 2009, 6, quoted in Mankoff, “Politics of U.S. Missile Defense,” 336. 
46 V. I. Trubnikov et al., Problems and Prospects of Russia’s Cooperation, 17. 
47 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 45. 
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percent sure about another state’s intentions.48 Despite any official statements, friendly 
relations one day can turn into armed conflict the next day without warning. In the 
Kremlin, a great degree of uncertainty surrounds the real U.S. objectives. These concerns 
were aptly summarized by former General Baluevsky in 2009: “The cases of Iran today 
and North Korea in the recent past serve only to camouflage the real designation of the 
system... The principal aim of the BMD region creation in Europe is Russia.”49 American 
actions have only increased Russian anxieties, rather than alleviating them. The U.S. 
Missile Defense Agency held that the proposed missile defense sites in Poland and the 
Czech Republic were the optimal places for the George W. Bush administration’s “third 
site,” but—according to Russian author Pavel Podvig—this was not the case.50  This 
judgment only added to Russian concerns. Philip Coyle and Victoria Samson argued that 
the Russian proposed site in Azerbaijan would actually be better for missile interception 
based on geography and geometry because it would provide better protection from the 
south.51 
Assuming that U.S. BMD intentions toward Russia are presently benign, Moscow 
rationally fears that a future U.S. administration could make the BMD system more 
capable, and redirect its purpose. President Obama scrapped President Bush’s plan for the 
“third site,” and a logical assumption is that a future administration could build upon the 
Obama administration’s EPAA to increase the number of interceptors and change their 
deployment locations. From the Russian perspective, U.S. actions also do not support its 
stated intent. In the Russian view, U.S. policies consistently threaten Russian security 
interests, such as the 2002 withdrawal from the 1972 ABM treaty. The U.S. withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty was seen by Moscow as a step to gain a strategic advantage by 
evading defensive limits,52 and to make matters worse, to “weaken one of the few 
48 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 31. 
49 Yury Baluevsky, “About BMD,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 4, 2007, 
http://www.rg.ru/2007/05/04/balyevskii.html  quoted in Sergey Oznobishchev, “Prospects for U.S-Russian 
Arms Control and Disarmament: A Russian Perspective,” Strategic Insight 8, no. 4 (September 2009): 3. 
50 Podvig, “Russia’s Nuclear Forces,” 17. 
51 Coyle and Samson, “Missile Defense Malfunction.” 
52 Podvig, “Russia’s Nuclear Forces,” 15–16. 
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remaining bases on which Russia could claim major power status.”53  Since 2009, Russia 
has been trying to obtain legal guarantees that the EPAA cannot intercept Russian 
ICBMs. The United States has repeatedly said that the system will not be directed against 
Russian missiles, but Washington arouses Moscow’s suspicion by refusing to make those 
statements legally binding. The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the 
ratification of the New START treaty subject to various conditions, including a 
prohibition of any constraints on missile defense beyond those specified in the treaty.54 
Currently, the New START Treaty places no restrictions on the deployment of missile 
defenses, so long as they are only used for BMD purposes. 
2. Military Blackmail 
Russia treats suspicious behavior as similar to threatening behavior because it 
holds that it has to assume the worst to survive in an anarchic world. If the United States 
did create an increasingly effective missile shield, Russians argue, Russia could be on the 
receiving end of military blackmail. In a realist world, blackmail is an attractive strategy 
because it relies on the threat of force to achieve results, rather than war.55 Moscow 
views the construction of U.S. missile defense facilities as military preparations geared 
toward Russia. In the words of realist Hans Morgenthau, “the political aim of military 
preparation is, in other words, to make the actual application of military force 
unnecessary by inducing the prospective enemy to desist from the use of military 
force.”56  
Since the Russian perception has been that the United States is attempting to 
establish a position to use blackmail, the Russian government has responded with 
blackmail of its own. An official view of the Russian Federation is that the purpose of the 
U.S. BMD program is to make Russia an object of U.S. military blackmail, so on 23 
53 Mankoff, “Politics of U.S. Missile Defense,” 334. 
54 United States Senate, Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms, The Library of Congress, May 13, 2010, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thomas2.  
55 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 138. 
56 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 28. 
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November 2011, Medvedev stated that unilaterally developing missile defense sites 
would provoke countermeasures.57 Russian officials have gone so far as to threaten 
preemptive strikes against those locations: “Russia says it is prepared to use ‘destructive 
force pre-emptively’ if the U.S. goes ahead with controversial plans for a missile defence 
system based in Central Europe.”58 
C. POWER MAXIMIZATION 
Due to the anarchic nature of the international system and the constant uncertainty 
of state intentions, Mearsheimer maintains, the best way to ensure survival is to be the 
most powerful state in the system.59 States pay close attention to the distribution of 
power, and consider how to maximize their share. Achieving global hegemony is highly 
improbable, but the first step is becoming the most powerful state in the region and thus 
achieving regional hegemony. States seek to alter the balance of power by increasing 
their own power while decreasing that of their rivals. In this zero sum game, “the pursuit 
of power stops only when hegemony is achieved.”60 There are two reasons why states 
will not stop this power accumulation: states are uncertain of how much power is 
“appropriate,” and how much power their rivals will have ten or twenty years down the 
road.61  
Morgenthau asserts that this power seeking behavior is inherent in human nature, 
for “the tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations.”62 
By this logic, Russia should be acting aggressively against the U.S. BMD program, and 
this is the behavior observed. Russia’s foreign policy follows two of Morgenthau’s basic 
57 Dmitri Medvedev, “Zayavleniye Prezidenta v Svyazi s Situatsiyey, Slozhivsheysya Vokrug Sistemy 
pro Stran NATO v Yevrope,” http://news.kremlin.ru/news/13637 quoted in Tsypkin, “Russia, America, and 
Missile Defense,” 56. 
58 “Russia Warns on Missile Defence Deal with NATO and US,” BBC, May 3, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17937795.    
59 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 33. 
60 Ibid., 34. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 31. 
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patterns of political strategy: to increase and to demonstrate power.63 The corresponding 
approaches are to pursue a policy of imperialism and a policy of prestige.64 The policy of 
imperialism is similar to Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism because Morgenthau 
and Mearsheimer both claim that states seek to maximize power. By attempting to gain 
influence over U.S. BMD policies, Russia is not only enhancing its own security, but 
increasing its political power in the process. 
1. Policy of the Status Quo versus Policy of Imperialism 
Russia is not trying to merely keep power because it is not following the policy of 
the status quo. According to Morgenthau, this policy “aims at the maintenance of the 
distribution of power which exists at a particular moment in history.”65 As Medvedev 
indicated in his August 2008 interview, his second principle of foreign policy is that 
Russia seeks to replace the United States’ unipolarity with a multipolar world.66 In 
Russia’s view, unipolarity is the status quo. The appropriate policy consistent with 
Russian aspirations is the policy of imperialism, “a policy that aims at the overthrow of 
the status quo, at a reversal of power relations between two or more nations.”67 This 
policy does not necessarily mean dominating countries or creating an empire reminiscent 
of colonialism, though Medvedev’s fifth principle was that Russia has “privileged 
interests” in certain countries and regions due to “special historical relations.”68 Russia 
would like to rebuild the influence, respect, and prestige it enjoyed as the Soviet Union. 
A recent example of this desire to increase influence is Russia’s effort to establish 
closer relations with former Soviet republics in a Eurasian Union. Putin stated in an 
address to the Federal Assembly in April 2005 that “the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
a major geopolitical disaster of the century,” and he would like to reverse this 
63 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 36. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 37. 
66 “Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev.” 
67 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 42. 
68 “Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev.” 
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disintegration process.69 The Eurasian Union is an economic integration effort that seeks 
to create a single market, and it was proposed by Putin while he was prime minister in 
2011. The Eurasian Union and other economic integration initiatives in the post-Soviet 
space “have been seen as vehicles for Russia’s traditional power approach in the 
neighbourhood, expressed in a mix of crude power and institutional weakness, and 
wrapped up in discourses that are predominantly orientated to the past.”70 Putin claims 
that this project is not “any kind of revival of the Soviet Union,”71 but Russia is grasping 
for increased power over its neighbors. 
2. Limited Imperialism 
Currently, Russia only has the capability to follow a limited goal of imperialism: 
to reestablish its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space and to increase its role in 
European security. American missile defense efforts impede the pursuit of these goals. In 
the Russian mindset, “zero sum calculations prevail” around “pragmatic 
reimperialization.”72 Calculations are zero sum in the sense that gains for the United 
States and Europe are seen as losses for Russia and vice versa. This perception was 
apparent following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The loss of Russia’s empire 
“stripped Moscow of about half the resources it commanded during the Cold War” which 
Russia believes were then “absorbed” by NATO.73 Furthermore, in the international 
arena, “the concept of power is always a relative one.”74 Measurements of power only 
matter in comparison to other countries, so Russia views missile defense in terms of the 
69 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” April 25, 
2005, President of Russia, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml.  
70 Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: 
Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry?” Chatham House Briefing Paper, August 2012, 2. 
71 Vladimir Putin, “A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making,” Izvestia, 
October 3, 2011, http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-
integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3-.  
72 Bugajski, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialism,” 3. 
73 Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (July/August 
2007): 68. 
74 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 143. 
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damage it could cause to its own capabilities, to say nothing of the advantages it would 
offer the United States and its allies in dealing with potential adversaries other than 
Russia. Russian tactics are pragmatic in the sense that Russian elites employ strategies 
including “a mixture of enticements, threats, incentives, and pressures” to promote their 
country’s national interests.75 Russia hopes to gain more political clout with its European 
neighbors by being involved in their defense. 
3. Divide and Conquer 
The U.S.-led missile defense endeavor is seen as a way to further alienate Russia 
from the European security architecture. One of Russia’s fundamental goals is to 
diminish the role of the United States in European security.76 According to Janusz 
Bugajski, “In this strategic struggle, ‘Eurasianism’ for Moscow involves two 
interconnected approaches: transforming Europe into an appendage of the Russian sphere 
of influence and debilitating Euro-Atlanticism by undercutting Europe’s connections with 
the United States.”77 Missile defense is one of the areas in which the United States aims 
to further solidify its connection to Europe in the security realm. As Michael Paul states, 
missile defense is “based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and 
solidarity.”78 Russia consistently seeks to undercut these principles. “Divide and rule” is 
a typical method of altering the balance of power; Russia has historically taken this 
approach to Europe, with the Soviet Union opposing all plans for a united Europe.79 In 
Moscow’s view, U.S. missile defense efforts would serve to strengthen European unity, 
further secure the American foothold on the continent, and drive Russia further away 
from the West. 
75 Bugajski, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialism,” 4. 
76 Ibid., 6. 
77 Ibid., 7. 
78 Michael Paul, Missile Defense Problems and Opportunities in NATO-Russia Relations, SWP 
Comments 19 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2012), 5. 
79 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 166–167. 
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D. PROPOSED COOPERATIVE EFFORTS 
The United States and NATO have proposed cooperation with Russia on BMD, 
but Russian reactions have been largely negative and have usually been followed by 
counterproposals. Russian officials believe that these so-called “cooperative” efforts 
purposefully alienate Russia from being an equal partner in missile defense. While the 
Bush administration’s third site was in the planning stages, U.S. officials proposed a 
series of cooperative efforts to alleviate Russian fears. In 2007–2008, the United States 
offered to allow Russian inspectors access to the planned BMD sites in Europe and the 
BMD sites in the United States, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said the European 
sites would not be operational until Iran had the capability to threaten Europe, and 
negotiators entertained the possibility of limiting BMD capabilities.80 The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, argued that these offers could not address Russia’s 
concerns, and that Russia needed to be involved in a real collaborative venture.81 To that 
effect, in 2007, President Putin proposed a joint U.S.-Russia BMD system that involved 
both countries’ military assets and comprehensive data exchanges.82 Russia was finding 
it increasingly difficult to alter its power position in Europe without being thoroughly 
involved in the U.S.-led BMD efforts. 
After the U.S. abandonment of the third site proposal in September 2009, Russia 
continued to be concerned about U.S. BMD programs due to the Obama administration’s 
announcement of the EPAA. The U.S. and its NATO allies have continued to declare 
their openness to cooperation with Russia on BMD, but Russia refuses to accept anything 
less than its definition of an equal partnership. In the 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration 
80 Richard Weitz, “Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO and Missile Defence,” 
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 52, no. 4 (2010): 108, doi: 10.1080/00396338.2010.506824. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Stephen J. Cimbala, “Going Ballistic Over Missile Defenses: What Matters and Why,” The Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 4 (2007): 452, doi: 10.1080/13518040701702445. 
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and in the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, NATO stated its desire to 
enhance cooperation with Russia.83  
Russia has, however, yet to gain the Alliance’s support for cooperative proposals 
suitable to the Kremlin’s goals of undermining NATO’s security primacy in Europe. In 
2011, President Medvedev proposed a “sectoral” approach to missile defense, in which 
the close integration of Russian and NATO systems would allow for the two partners to 
be responsible over a certain area. Russia would be responsible for intercepting missiles 
heading toward Europe from the South-East. Since Russia would be in charge of 
defending NATO European territory, the offer was quickly rejected by the Alliance.  
NATO proposed further cooperative efforts at the 2012 Chicago Summit to 
establish joint data centers with Russia; however, Moscow stated that it was not ready to 
consider this proposal.84 Richard Weitz suggests that Russia has little to offer in terms of 
a joint BMD architecture due to its less advanced capabilities,85 but there is also clearly a 
historically based “trust deficit”86 between the two sides. Russian officials believe that 
the Alliance’s rejection of their proposals is proof that the United States and its NATO 
allies are intentionally attempting to mislead Russia about the purpose of Alliance BMD 
programs. Russia cannot continue to profoundly influence the direction of European 
security while being excluded from U.S.-led missile defense. 
E. ARMAMENTS 
In addition to “divide and rule,” an “armaments” approach is another method to 
maintain or reestablish the balance of power by trying to keep up with and eventually 
83 “Lisbon Summit Declaration,” November 20, 2010, 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_11/2010_11_11DE1DB9B73C4F9BBFB52B2C94722
EAC_PR_CP_2010_0155_ENG-Summit_LISBON.pdf; Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, May 20, 
2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm.  
84 Robert Zadra, “NATO, Russia and Missile Defence,” Survival 56, no. 4 (August-September 2014): 
52. 
85 Richard Weitz, “Déjà Vu with BMD: The Improbability of Russia-NATO Missile Defense,” 
Russie.Nei.Visions, no. 67 (January 2013): 9. 
86 Ibid., 13. 
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surpass other nations.87 For Russia, the U.S. BMD program is the beginning of the 
classic security dilemma: Country A takes security measures that threaten country B’s 
security, so country B increases its security investments which in turn threaten country A 
in an endless cycle. In 2012, Prime Minister Putin pledged to match the United States in 
armaments: “Russia’s military technical response to the U.S. global missile defence 
system and its segments in Europe will be effective even if disproportionate. But it will 
fully match U.S. steps in missile defence.”88 
1. U.S. Defense Threatens Russian Offense 
Rejecting U.S. statements that the missile defense is designed to counter Iranian 
missiles, Moscow holds that U.S. defensive efforts threaten Russia’s offensive forces, so 
Russia is seeking to develop greater offensive capabilities. Vladimir Putin stated that 
Russia would safeguard the strategic balance “by developing the ability to overcome any 
missile defence system and protect Russia’s retaliation potential.”89 Moreover, in 2012, 
then Chief of the General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, threatened to station short 
range, Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region to counter the European missile 
defense infrastructure. Iskander is theoretically nuclear-capable, but Russia has not tested 
the missile system with nuclear warheads.90 Russia is also developing a new MIRVed 
(Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles) silo-based ICBM which would be 
able to better penetrate missile defense systems.91 Whether Russia’s defense industry is 
capable of creating a new missile in time or whether Russia even needs a new missile is 
another matter. 
87 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 168. 
88 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
Archive of the Official Site of the 2008–2012 Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, 
February 20, 2012, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185/.  
89 Putin, “Being Strong.” 
90 Nikolai Sokov and Miles A. Pomper, “Is Russia Violating the INF Treaty?” The National Interest, 
February 11, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/russia-violating-the-inf-treaty-9859. 
91 Podvig, “Russia’s Nuclear Forces,” 11. 
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2. Modernization Efforts 
Nonetheless, Russia has begun several modernization efforts to improve its 
nuclear arsenal. In 2012, Prime Minister Putin promised additional modern ICBMs and 
SLBMs: “In the coming decade, Russian armed forces will be provided with over 400 
modern land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.”92 Since then, Russia’s 
Strategic Rocket Forces have planned to begin production of the liquid-fueled Sarmat, a 
heavy ICBM with several warheads and missile defense penetration aids intended to 
replace the SS-18 by 2020.93 In 2013, the Russian Air Force approved the development 
of a new nuclear bomber, presently called the PAK-DA, to replace the Tu-160 Blackjack 
and Tu-95MS Bear heavy bombers.94 Russia also flight tested a new ICBM known as the 
RS-26 Rubezh in 2012 and 2013, which may be deployed within the next few years. 
F. POLICY OF PRESTIGE 
Russian military investments and political posturing are facets of Russia’s policy 
of prestige. Normally, the policy of prestige is never an end in itself: in this case, the 
policy of prestige is one of the methods used to achieve the aims of Russia’s policy of 
imperialism.95 The policy of prestige helps accomplish these aims because it influences 
the evaluations of power relations.96 Perceptions of power relations, in turn, affect state 
behavior, and Russia wants the prestige of being treated as an equal partner in missile 
defense. Russia is known to hold large displays of military force to demonstrate its power 
to the world. These Russian military demonstrations, such as the Zapad (West) and 
Vostok (East) strategic exercises, are highly publicized. As Tsypkin states, 
92 Putin, “Being Strong.” 
93 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 70, no. 2 (2014): 78, doi: 10.1177/0096340214523565.  
94 “Russian Air Force Approves New Bomber Design – Commander,” Ria Novosti, April 11, 2013, 
http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20130411/180586959/Russian-Air-Force-Approves-New-Bomber-Design--
Commander.html. 
95 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 67. 
96 Ibid., 74. 
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“demonstration of power is the currency of Russian politics.”97 Reminiscent of the Cold 
War, Russia is pursuing a policy of prestige to “weaken the unity of the hostile 
coalition.”98 Medvedev’s “sectoral” defense proposal, if it had been accepted, would 
have not only granted Moscow responsibility for the defense of some NATO territory, 
but it would have proven that Russia is unequivocally an equal strategic partner in missile 
defense. As a great power, Russia believes that it should be accorded the appropriate 
respect in the international arena, and it will go to great lengths in political negotiations to 
accomplish this goal. 
G. CALCULATED COOPERATION 
A possible counter argument to this idea of Russia’s aggressive realist foreign 
policy behavior over strategic missile defense is that Russia and the United States have, 
to some extent, cooperated in the past. This counter argument is tenuous because 
cooperation can occur in a realist world, such as the oft cited examples of the arms 
control agreements during the Cold War.99 This is not to say that there is no potential at 
all for the United States and Russia to cooperate on missile defense at some point in the 
future, but the past has shown that Russia prefers calculated cooperation. One way for 
Russia to demonstrate its global power status is to show that it is an equal to the United 
States in missile defense, and Moscow will continue to try to get as much as it can from 
these cooperative efforts. 
After the NATO-Russia Council met in Lisbon in 2010, prospects for future 
cooperation on missile defense looked positive. In a joint statement, the two parties stated 
that they had already agreed to a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, and they agreed 
to continue discussions on missile defense cooperation.100 However, Russian leaders 
97 Tsypkin, “Russia, America, and Missile Defense,” 59. 
98 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 75. 
99 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 53. 
100 “NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 20, 
2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68871.htm.  
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prefer to “continue their interaction with the U.S. to gain strategic advantages.”101 In 
regard to the European Phased Adaptive Approach, some analysts argue that Russia felt 
compelled to cooperate because it cannot stop the BMD program in Europe, but Russia 
can shape its direction on more favorable terms if it plays along.102 Pavel Podvig thinks 
that it is more realistic to assume that Russia wants to cooperate to determine the true 
scope of the BMD plans and to undoubtedly influence those policies.103 Russia has used 
the proposed U.S. missile defense shield in Europe as a pawn in “security chess” and has 
exploited the supposed threat to its national security as a means of gaining 
concessions.104 Looking through a realist lens, Moscow’s cooperation is calculated to 
increase power, influence, and status while guaranteeing the survival of the Russian state. 
H. STRATEGIC CONCESSIONS 
The Russian plan to cooperate to just the appropriate extent to gain concessions 
and influence over U.S. policies on strategic missile defense has been rather successful. 
Russia has utilized an imperialist policy to challenge the status quo, while the United 
States has responded with relative appeasement. In this regard, the Russian Federation 
appears to hold a certain degree of power over the United States in the missile defense 
arena. Power is “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men.”105 Political 
power, according to Morgenthau, is influence, so one has power over another if the 
former can influence the actions of the latter.106 Based on this definition, Russia has 
power over the United States and will continue to exert this influence until a greater force 
halts this inertia. 
101 Bugajski, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialism,” 10. 
102 Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, Missile Defense and NATO’s Lisbon Summit, Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress (January 11, 2011), 8–9. 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41549_20110111.pdf.   
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106 Ibid., 27. 
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1. New START Treaty Concessions 
Another realist assumption noted by Mearsheimer is that states are rational actors 
and aware of their external environment and that they pay attention to the behavior of 
other states and react based on that behavior.107 In the Russian case, Moscow looks at 
U.S actions, and weak responses provoke further aggression. In the negotiations for the 
2010 New START Treaty, Russia obtained critical concessions. Russian negotiators 
managed to insert a statement in the preamble highlighting the connection between 
strategic offensive and defensive forces. Moscow will probably use this to prevent any 
further reductions in nuclear weapons. Additionally, the United States “agreed to Russian 
demands to count its conventional weapons mounted on strategic platforms as strategic 
weapons.”108 Russia was unable to obtain a legally binding provision on the deployment 
of missile defenses beyond the limits stated in Article V that prohibits the conversion of 
ICBM and SLBM launchers to use missile interceptors or launchers of missile 
interceptors to use ICBMs and SLBMs.109 In the Russian mindset, conceding only 
encourages further attempts to use aggressive power politics. 
2. Missile Defense Cancellations 
Russia has also obtained much larger concessions in strategic missile defense that 
are consistent with the Kremlin’s realist goals. The Bush administration wanted the “third 
site” in Europe, but the Russians fought the proposal and the plans were cancelled by 
President Obama and replaced by the EPAA. In March 2013, the United States cancelled 
plans for the EPAA’s Phase 4 deployment of interceptors, which was hypothetically the 
phase most threatening to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Despite the official reasons 
articulated for the cancellation, this action was widely seen as a major concession by 
Washington and a victory for Moscow. 
107 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 31. 
108 Stephen Blank, “Beyond the Reset Policy: Current Dilemmas of U.S.-Russia Relations,” 
Comparative Strategy 29, no. 4 (2010): 337. 
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29 
 
                                                 
Russia behaves like a typical actor on the anarchic international stage, and the 
assumptions stemming from realist theories aptly explain this behavior in strategic 
missile defense. Russia desires to have a greater share of power in the world, claiming 
that it is already one of the “great powers.” Moscow takes into account balance of power 
considerations in its interactions with the United States, and U.S. BMD programs 
complicate the pursuit of Russia’s ambitions. The EPAA is seen as a future threat to 
Russia’s survival, so Russia uses blackmail, calculated cooperation, and any other means 




III. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 
Russia’s nuclear arsenal plays an integral role in protecting Russia’s national 
security by acting as a strategic deterrent, but in contexts short of war, these weapons 
fulfill primarily political purposes. The threat of force is always present with a nuclear 
arsenal, either implicitly or explicitly, but Moscow also uses its nuclear weapons as 
bargaining chips in negotiations concerning reductions and related constraints. Nuclear 
arms control is an aspect of Russia’s nuclear strategy that Moscow utilizes to gain 
strategic concessions. Additionally, nuclear weapons are considered to be a symbol of 
Russia’s great power status. Ultimately, Russia’s decision making on nuclear arms 
control depends on its capabilities and the perceived capabilities of its potential 
adversaries. In this regard, Moscow believes that U.S.-led BMD efforts have the potential 
to endanger its nuclear deterrent capability. Russia will not engage in nuclear force 
reductions if it thinks this deterrent capability might be compromised. Russian nuclear 
behavior, as expressed through political and military documents, statements, and actions, 
can be assessed by looking through a realist lens. The principal features of realism 
include excellent organizational tools for interpreting Russian nuclear policies as a means 
to gain and maintain power. 
The same realist factors that guide Russian decision making in missile defense 
affect Russia’s strategic planners on the issue of nuclear arms control. Russian decision-
making is dominated by relative power calculations as Russia embarks on its “policy of 
imperialism” supported by its “policy of prestige.”110 Realist thinkers tend to disagree 
over the exact definition of power, but two main definitions of power apply to the 
Russian nuclear case: power as influence and capability. According to Hans Morgenthau, 
power is influence. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, divides power into two categories: 
military and latent power. Military power consists of the material capabilities of a state’s 
armed forces, whereas latent power is measured in terms of wealth and population.111 
110 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 36. 
111 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 55. 
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Waltz shares this idea of power as capabilities: “Power is estimated by comparing the 
capabilities of a number of units [states].”112  The principal features of realism—from 
anarchy and state survival to prestige and relative power calculations—all shape Russian 
decision making on nuclear strategy. 
A. RUSSIA AGAINST THE WEST 
Nuclear weapons have continued to feature prominently in Russian decision-
making since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian elites still perceive a conflict 
between Russia and the West in which the importance of classic deterrence cannot be 
overstated. In February 2012, two months before his third term as president, Vladimir 
Putin stated that nuclear weapons have been the key to the survival of the Russian state as 
a sovereign entity: 
We should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak. It is for 
this reason that we will under no circumstances surrender our strategic 
deterrent capability, and, indeed, will in fact strengthen it. It was this 
strength that enabled us to maintain our national sovereignty during the 
extremely difficult 1990s, when, let’s be frank, we did not have anything 
else to argue with.113 
It is the belief of many Russians that their state has only held off the United States 
and NATO from interfering directly in their internal affairs due to Russia’s nuclear 
weapons. This belief was expressed by high ranking Russian military officers in 2000: 
“The presence and high level of combat readiness of nuclear weapons is the best 
guarantee that the U.S. and NATO will not try to establish their ‘order’ in our country as 
well, like the way it was done in Yugoslavia.”114 It therefore makes sense that “nuclear 
weapons and strategic strike capability are the highest priority of the Russian 
112 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 98. 
113 Putin, “Being strong.” 
114 Major General Vladimir Grigoryev, Colonel Nikolay Radayev and Lieutenant Colonel Yuri 
Protasov, “An ‘Umbrella’ Instead of a ‘Shield’—Do Nuclear Weapons Have a Future?” Armeyskiy Sbornik, 
1 Feb. 2000, in FBIS, CEP 20000503000116 quoted in David S. Yost, “Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear 
Forces,” International Affairs 77, no. 3 (2001): 534. 
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Federation.”115 Since survival is the primary goal of the state, Russia, above all else, acts 
to preserve its existence and freedom of action. Russia places such an intense emphasis 
on its nuclear deterrent not only to survive (though that is reason enough for Moscow), 
but to thrive in the international system as a respected great power. 
B. DETERRENCE 
From the Russian perspective, deterrence is the key to survival. This deterrent 
framework is essential for laying the foundation for Russian behavior with respect to 
nuclear arms control. There are a number of factors that go into Russia’s nuclear 
planning. Nikolai Sokov, in analyzing the reasons why states rely on nuclear weapons, 
focuses on variables that specifically affect Russian reliance on nuclear forces. Three of 
these variables are: “acute perception of external threat,” “perceived absence of 
alternative means to ensure security,” and “perception of high utility of nuclear 
weapons.”116  
1. Threat Perceptions 
In terms of threat perception, Russia views most of the policies of the United 
States as consistently undermining Russian foreign and security policy interests.117 These 
policies include political issues, such as NATO enlargement and the perceived U.S. 
support of color revolutions in the post-Soviet space, and military concerns, such as U.S. 
precision conventional strike capacity, perceived U.S. attempts to upset strategic stability, 
and the U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Russian elites are not distinct 
from their population in worrying about nuclear threats as well. According to an opinion 
poll conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, thirty-
four percent of respondents named the threat of a nuclear war on a global scale as a 
115 Schneider, Nuclear Forces and Doctrine, 1.  
116 Nikolai Sokov, “Why do States Rely on Nuclear Weapons? The Case of Russia and Beyond,” The 
Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2002): 105–106, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92sokov.pdf.  
117 Andrei Tsygankov, “US-Russia Relations in the Post-Western World,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal and 
Kristi Govelli, eds., Responding to a Resurgent Russia (New York: Springer, 2012), 48. 
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“serious threat.”118 Nineteen percent of those surveyed viewed the deployment of U.S. 
BMD systems in Europe as another threat to Russian security.119 Many Russians regard 
nuclear weapons as a way to address these threats. 
Threat “perception,” as opposed to actual “threats” to national security, is an 
important distinction because it does not matter whether the threat is real, only whether 
the perception of the threat exists. The intent of a possible adversary may be benign, but 
intentions are irrelevant in a realist world. Despite any rhetoric or actions, states can 
never be one-hundred percent sure about another state’s intentions, and relations can turn 
hostile in the blink of an eye.120 Russia acts in such a manner in the realm of nuclear 
weapons in addition to missile defense. Quinlivan and Oliker support this assertion, 
noting that some Russian analysts hold concerns about the United States based on 
capabilities, not necessarily intentions,121 though Russians are also skeptical about the 
“hidden” U.S. objectives: “many Russian analysts, including military analysts, believe 
that the United States actively seeks nuclear superiority (i.e., the ability to launch a 
debilitating first strike) to ensure its ability to influence Russia’s policies and actions.”122 
Russia also fears that U.S. conventional precision strike weapons and the EPAA could 
someday upset the strategic balance by neutralizing Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. 
2. Anarchy Revisited 
A second factor, the perceived absence of an alternate means of ensuring Russia’s 
security, affects Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons. Specifically, there exists a 
perceived absence of reliable and capable allies, international organizations, and treaties, 
in addition to a lack of an international security framework to address Russia’s security 
118 Alexander Nikitin, “Nuclear Disarmament in a Non-Proliferation Context: A Russian 
Perspective,” Strategic Analysis 34, no. 2 (2010): 202, doi: 10.1080/09700161003592908. 
119 Nikitin, “Nuclear Disarmament,” 203. 
120 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 31. 
121 James T. Quinlivan and Olga Oliker, “Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Russian Approaches to a 
New Environment and Implications for the United States.” Rand Corporation, 2011, 20, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1075.pdf. 
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concerns.123 Russia regards its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies as 
incapable of protecting its security. This absence of reliable outside aid is indicative of an 
anarchic international system, another core assumption of realism. Anarchy promotes a 
“self-help” environment in which states must attend to their security requirements 
because there is no higher authority to come to their aid.124 Sokov speculates that the 
inability of the United Nations Security Council to prevent unilateral NATO military 
action in Kosovo and the failure of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) to become Europe’s primary security institution contribute to Russia’s 
view of having to rely solely on its own military assets to ensure its security.125 Nuclear 
weapons allow Russia to help itself in this anarchic system by focusing its deterrent on 
the United States, the other NATO allies, and implicitly any other country that may 
consider engaging in hostilities with Russia, notably China.126 
3. Expanded Roles of Nuclear Weapons 
Sokov’s third variable is that the perception of the high utility of nuclear weapons 
based on the concept of “de-escalation” affects Russia’s nuclear strategy.127 In the 
absence of comprehensive conventional forces allowing for a flexible response to a 
variety of possible encounters, Russia needs nuclear weapons to serve expanded roles at 
lower levels of conflict. These include non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW or tactical 
nuclear weapons), of which Russia possesses a much greater number than the United 
States. Lowering the threshold to using nuclear weapons in limited and regional conflicts 
could deter an adversary from attack because that enemy would be unwilling to risk even 
a limited nuclear confrontation to achieve its goals.128 The Kremlin has recently 
published documents that show how it has lowered its nuclear threshold: the Military 
123 Sokov, “Why do States Rely on Nuclear Weapons?” 106. 
124 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 33. 
125 Sokov, “Why do States Rely on Nuclear Weapons?” 106. 
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Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2000 and 2010), and the 2009 National Security 
Strategy until 2020.  
C. RUSSIAN POLITICAL-MILITARY DECLARATIONS 
An analysis of Russia’s security policy documents and military doctrines is 
necessary because they provide insight into Russian views on the likelihood of different 
kinds of conflict, general assessments on the means Russia is willing to use in order to 
address those conflicts, and the deterrence message the Kremlin would like to convey to 
an international audience. Russia uses the term “doctrine” in a much broader sense than 
the United States. Russian military doctrines are documents comparable to the U.S. 
National Military Strategy. Schneider states that analyzing Russian nuclear weapons 
doctrine is critical because “doctrine determines the allocation of resources, war 
planning, and war training. These in turn, will determine what options Russia has 
available, in the event of a future crisis.”129 Russia is unwilling to severely limit those 
options by participating in deep reductions of nuclear armaments. The former director of 
the main think tank of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, Major General Vladimir 
Dvorkin (retired), notes that Russian rhetoric, including that in military documents, is 
often inflated, and “there exists a vast gulf between what is said and what is done.”130 
However, when it comes to nuclear strategy, declaratory policy and nuclear force 
structure are necessary for analyzing Russia’s nuclear posture. 
1. Russian Military Doctrines 
The last two Russian military doctrines were published in 2000 and 2010, and 
they contain some noteworthy conclusions about reasons for the possible use of nuclear 
weapons. The 2000 military doctrine emphasizes the “decline in the threat of the 
unleashing of a large-scale war, including a nuclear war,” but indirectly names NATO 
129 Schneider, “Nuclear Forces and Doctrine,” 19. 
130 Vladimir Dvorkin, “Reading Russia’s Posture,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 63, no. 4 
(July/August 2007): 16. 
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expansion and U.S. policies as external threats.131 The document also lowers the 
threshold of use for nuclear weapons “in response to large-scale aggression utilizing 
conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian 
Federation.”132 The 2010 military doctrine maintains this threshold. This doctrine also 
explicitly names NATO as an external military danger in addition to “the creation and 
deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining global stability and 
violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere” and “the 
deployment of strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems.”133 
2. Russia’s National Security Strategy 
A document published in 2009, Russia’s National Security Strategy until 2020,  
also names existing threats to security: the policy of countries seeking military supremacy 
in nuclear and conventional strategic arms, unilaterally developing global missile 
defenses, and non-compliance with international arms control agreements, which are all 
clear references to the United States.134 Russia believes that the United States is 
attempting to achieve military superiority in nuclear and conventional strike capabilities. 
The reference to global missile defenses concerns the U.S.-led BMD efforts. The 
departure from international arms control agreements is likely an allusion to the United 
States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, which was in fact entirely consistent 
with the treaty’s provisions. This document is another example of how Russia orients its 
declared defense policy around the perceived threats posed by the United States and its 
NATO allies. As Jacob Kipp and other experts have observed, the Russians are discreet 
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in their references to China.135 Threat perceptions influence the doctrine articulating 
Russia’s view of deterrence, which affects Russian behavior on nuclear arms control. 
3. Deterrence or Political Purposes? 
There is speculation that Russia lowered its nuclear threshold not for deterrent 
reasons, but to serve solely political purposes: “a number of respected Russian military 
analysts argue that the real motive is to increase political clout against the United States 
and NATO.”136 The deterrence argument seems more valid in this instance because 
Russia has other means with which it can exert political influence when dealing with the 
United States on nuclear issues. Raising the nuclear threshold has never been on the table 
as a bargaining chip, and it is rarely mentioned, if ever, in arms control negotiations. 
Russia is more likely to use nuclear weapons reductions, including strategic and 
nonstrategic warheads and delivery systems, as a part of its bargaining position in seeking 
concessions over defense issues such as missile defense and global conventional strike 
capabilities. 
4. Ambiguous Statements 
According to Marcel de Haas, Russian statements on nuclear weapons have been 
“ambiguous” because Russia wants to modernize its nuclear arsenal to maintain parity 
with the United States and to make up for deficiencies in its conventional forces, but 
Russia’s 2009 National Security Strategy to 2020 also proposed nuclear arms reductions, 
most likely to eliminate its obsolete weapons.137 Proposing disarmament in this 
document shows that Russia wishes to appear to be a responsible partner in nuclear 
nonproliferation, but Russia, in reality, wants to eliminate parts of its aging nuclear 
arsenal that need to be cut anyway.  
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For Russia, nuclear disarmament is not, and has never been, about being a 
responsible international actor in the fight to support nuclear nonproliferation. Russia’s 
2009 National Security Strategy to 2020 states a possibility of a world free of WMD, but 
this will never be a goal of Russia. In June 2013 in Berlin, President Obama proposed to 
cut New START-accountable U.S. and Russian nuclear forces by a third, but the Russian 
response was overwhelmingly negative.138 It is highly unlikely in the current context that 
Russia would consider strategic nuclear force levels lower than those specified in the 
New START Treaty. Contrary to this assertion, in 2010 Alexander Nikitin optimistically 
wrote that Russia’s leadership has expressed “appreciation of this goal,” and that 
reaching a “global zero” has become “thinkable and talkable.”139 This is not possible for 
three reasons: complete nuclear disarmament would ruin Russia’s prestige as a nuclear 
power equal to the United States, would take away Russia’s only claim to superpower 
status, and would greatly amplify the significance of the United States’ already 
overwhelming conventional military superiority. 
5. Foreign Policy Concept  
Nuclear parity is not just seen as a security issue to ensure the survival of the 
Russian state, but it defines Russia as an equal strategic partner with the United States, 
the world’s greatest military power. The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept claims that Russia 
is “the largest Euro-Asian power,” “one of [the] influential centers in the modern world,” 
and “one of the leading States of the world,”140 but this is predicated on Moscow having 
the military assets, specifically nuclear, to maintain such a position. Russia’s elites view 
nuclear weapons as pillars of the Russian Federation’s great power status. These weapons 
are monuments to the prestige granted to the Soviet Union as a global superpower, and 
Russia clings to—and modernizes—these remnants of the past, hoping to restore its 
former glory. 
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D. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR EXERCISES 
Prestige has always been an important driver of Russian foreign policy behavior. 
Russia’s urge to display power is so incessant that Tsypkin’s observation deserves 
repeating: “Demonstration of power is the currency of Russian politics.”141 Russian 
military exercises, especially ones involving nuclear scenarios, provide Russia great 
opportunities to demonstrate power. In the Zapad-99 (West-1999) exercise, Russia 
simulated nuclear strikes against the aggressor forces. The western direction clearly 
meant that the targets were the United States and its NATO allies. Similar exercises have 
occurred since then simulating the use of nuclear weapons against the United States and 
other NATO countries. In 2009, Russia and Belarus conducted simulated military strikes, 
including nuclear, against Poland.142 In Russia’s 2010 Vostok (East) exercise, Russia 
implemented the first use of nuclear weapons to de-escalate a hypothetical conventional 
attack.143 In 2014, President Putin, along with the presidents of four other CSTO 
countries—Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—supervised a strategic nuclear 
drill that simulated a large-scale nuclear attack in retaliation to strikes on Russia.144 
Russian ICBMs and SLBMs were launched on warning, supposedly in response to 
NATO nuclear attacks.145 President Putin and other high officials have personally 
participated in these exercises, a rare event for a high profile public official in any 
country.146  
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Although Russian officials would claim that these exercises are meant to ensure 
the operational readiness of Russia’s nuclear forces, these displays of power are also 
meant to intimidate and to convey a message of strength to potential rivals. This further 
supports Russia’s policy of prestige that seeks to influence perceptions of power relations 
by various audiences. From the Russian perspective, shows of force support deterrence 
objectives. These nuclear exercises may also display Russia’s belief about the likelihood 
of such a conflict. If there is a possibility of using nuclear weapons in a future conflict, 
even a localized or regional conflict, nuclear arms control becomes less about reductions 
and more about power plays and political maneuvering. 
E. NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS 
Nuclear arms control is an aspect of Russian behavior in which Russia seeks 
parity with the United States for the purposes of prestige by being treated as an equal 
partner, security by maintaining strategic stability, and opportunities for political 
concessions. This is not a new phenomenon for Russia, for the Soviet Union also placed 
great emphasis on arms control: “The importance that Russia attaches to the arms control 
talks reflects the long Soviet/Russian tradition of looking at national security through the 
prism of the relationship with the United States.”147  What has changed is a loss of status 
and power, and Russia has responded to this outcome by placing a greater emphasis on its 
nuclear weapons. 
1. Nuclear Parity 
Russia’s approach to achieving nuclear parity involves preserving the strategic 
balance by having a nuclear arsenal similar in number and capability to that of the United 
States. This is accomplished by participating in strategic arms treaties with the United 
States, the most recent being the 2010 New START Treaty that entered into force in 
February 2011. Russia will only engage in discussions on nuclear arms reductions so long 




                                                 
as they do not alter the strategic status quo,148 or are, as stated in Russia’s 2008 Foreign 
Policy Concept, “up to a minimum level sufficient to maintain strategic stability.”149 In 
December 2013, the head of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Colonel General Sergei 
Karakayev, stated that Russia would need approximately 1,500 warheads “in order to 
resolve tasks of strategic deterrence,” taking into account the number of warheads held by 
other nuclear powers, most importantly the United States.150 Karakayev’s reference to 
about 1,500 warheads was clearly a reckoning in New START-accountable terms and 
therefore omitted nonstrategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed weapons. The New 
START Treaty was beneficial for Russia because it could gain concessions while keeping 
its entire nuclear arsenal. 
These statements about maintaining “parity,” “the status quo,” and “strategic 
balance” would seem to support Morgenthau’s policy of the status quo, which involves 
preserving the distribution of power at a point in time.151 This would also be consistent 
with Waltz’s theory of structural realism and the views of other neorealist thinkers who 
believe that “states constrain and limit each other.”152 There is a fine line between 
maintaining and gaining power. Russia’s behavior seems aimed at limiting the 
capabilities of its perceived adversaries while enhancing its own position under the guise 
of being “equal.” Russia would rather see the balance of power shift in its favor and acts 
to effect that change. Negotiations about strategic arms reductions constitute an area for 
Russia to exert power. 
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2. New START Treaty 
The 2010 New START Treaty is the most recent iteration of strategic arms 
reductions pertaining primarily to nuclear weapons. According to Article II of the New 
START Treaty,  
Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs 
and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, 
and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into 
force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in 
accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:  
(a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy 
bombers;  
(b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed 
SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;  
(c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and 
non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy 
bombers.153  
 
The combination of these 700 and 800 strategic platforms is left to the discretion 
of the parties to the treaty. Heavy bombers have the most lenient counting rules: each 
bomber counts as one toward the warhead total, so even a bomber carrying a dozen or so 
warheads is still just one toward the 1,550 limit. Moscow was apparently against 
counting a heavy bomber’s full nuclear payload because “Russia objected to the 
transparency provisions that this arrangement would entail.”154 
a. Negotiations 
While negotiating the terms of the New START Treaty, Russia sought 
concessions on conventional strike capability and missile defense. Russia fears that 
conventional weapons on strategic platforms could be as destabilizing as nuclear 
weapons due to their high accuracy. While an attack using nuclear weapons would clearly 
153 New START Treaty, April 8, 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf. 
154 Pavel Podvig, “The New START Bomber Count and Upload Potential,” March 31, 2010 quoted in 
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invite nuclear retaliation, an attack with precision-guided munitions might present a more 
ambiguous challenge. Therefore, the Russians were adamant in including conventional 
strike weapons in the treaty. Conventional weapons on strategic missiles count against 
the aggregate numbers in the New START Treaty. The United States “agreed to Russian 
demands to count its conventional weapons mounted on strategic platforms as strategic 
weapons.”155 Russian negotiators also tried to limit missile defenses, but the U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 eliminated much of Russia’s leverage over the 
United States in missile defense.156 The Russians did manage to obtain a statement in the 
preamble linking offense and defense: “Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship 
between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship 
will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced.”157 Under this treaty, 
there are no binding constraints on the deployment of missile defenses other than those 
described in Article V prohibiting the conversion of missile interceptor launchers to fire 
ICBMs and SLBMs or of ICBM and SLBM launchers to fire missile interceptors.158 
Additionally, there are no restrictions on the development of long-range conventional 
strike capabilities based on platforms other than those which are New START-
accountable. 
b. Estimating Nuclear Force Structure 
After Russia eliminates its obsolete weapons, its nuclear arsenal will fall below 
the New START limits, so it actually needs to do nothing additional in order to comply 
with the treaty. The United States agreed to make a unilateral strategic offensive force 
reduction while Russia is allowed a nuclear force buildup. A number of sources estimate 
how U.S. and Russian nuclear forces will look after meeting the New START Treaty’s 
provisions. Evaluations vary, but Table 1 is drawn from an analysis comparing Russia’s 
155 Blank, “Beyond the Reset,” 337. 
156 Podvig, “Instrumental Influences,” 44. 
157 New START Treaty. 
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estimated strategic nuclear force structure to that of the United States following New 
START counting rules: 
Table 1.   Notional U.S. and Russian Strategic Offensive Forces under New 
START159 
 United States Russia 
Deployed ICBMs 420 192 
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs 420 542 
Deployed SLBMs 240 128 
Warheads on Deployed SLBMs 1,090 640 
Deployed Heavy Bombers 40 76 
Warheads attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers 40 76 
Total Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers 700 396 
Total Warheads 1,550 1,258 
 
F. RUSSIAN NONCOMPLIANCE CONCERNS 
Although a primary concern for Russia is to maintain nuclear parity, Russian 
behavior indicates that Moscow would like an advantage. One apparent aspect of 
Russia’s nuclear strategy is to get U.S. concessions to sign arms control agreements, and 
cheat when it is deemed necessary. Russia may participate in arms control agreements for 
political purposes and to show its equal status with the United States, but Russia will 
circumvent treaty provisions if they interfere with Moscow’s nuclear strategy.  
Realist thinking supports this assertion. According to Mearsheimer, states will 
ideally strive for nuclear supremacy in their quest for global hegemony, though nuclear 
superiority is a highly unlikely outcome.160 Despite the low probability of success, states 
will still try to gain an edge over their opponents. Mearsheimer asserts that both the 
United States and Russia have a history of attempting to establish a nuclear advantage 
over each other by developing “sophisticated counterforce arsenals” and “elaborate clever 
159 Steven Pifer, “The Next Round: The United States and Nuclear Arms Reduction After New 
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strategies for fighting and winning a nuclear war.”161 This logic could partially explain 
Russia’s alleged cheating and noncompliance with arms control agreements. 
1. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
In 2013, Putin’s chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, openly expressed interest in 
reconsidering compliance with the INF Treaty162 as a threat and a way of building 
political pressure. By some accounts, including that of the U.S. government, Russia has 
already openly violated the INF Treaty. Among the reports of Russian noncompliance 
with the INF Treaty, the main concerns are with the testing of missile systems, such as 
the Iskander R-500 and the RS-26 Rubezh, that have the capability to strike within the 
banned range from 500 to 5,500 km. According to Mark Schneider, Russia has 
consistently violated arms control agreements since Soviet times, and it will notably 
continue to do so because there are almost no repercussions for its actions.163 
a. Iskander R-500 
Others contend that claims of Russian violations are, in fact, exaggerated, if not 
completely fictional. One concern involves unidentified ground-launched cruise missiles 
that are suspected to be the Iskander R-500, though it has not been confirmed. Russian 
officials have stated that Russia has the ability to extend the range of Iskander cruise 
missiles beyond 500 km, and Jeffrey Lewis speculates that “some critics have 
conflated—perhaps willfully—Russian statements that it could extend the range with 
claims that it has.”164 The United States government raised the issue of the unidentified 
cruise missiles with Russia, but Russia dismissed the matter. It was not until July 2014 
that the United States categorized these launches as a violation. 
161 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 225. 
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Michael Gordon wrote two recent articles in The New York Times describing the 
U.S. concerns about Russian violations of the INF Treaty. Citing unidentified U.S. 
officials, in January 2014 Gordon wrote, “it took years for American intelligence to 
gather information on Russia’s new missile system, but by the end of 2011, officials say 
it was clear that there was a compliance concern.”165 In January 2014, the United States 
informed its NATO allies about a possible compliance issue,166 but it was not until July 
2014 that the United States officially declared that Russia was in violation of the INF 
Treaty.167 Gordon noted that “the allegation will be made public soon in the State 
Department’s annual report on international compliance with arms control 
agreements.”168 The Russian Foreign Ministry denied these allegations, stating that the 
U.S. claims are unfounded.169 Furthermore, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s statement 
voiced Russia’s own concerns about the United States violating the INF Treaty.170 
b. RS-26 Rubezh 
The second U.S. concern with the INF Treaty involves the RS-26, which is more 
of a circumvention than a violation of the treaty provisions. Technically, the testing of the 
RS-26 did not constitute a violation of the INF Treaty. The Russians first tested the 
missile in May 2012 at 5,800 km, considered ICBM range, before testing the Rubezh 
twice more at approximately 2,000 km. Since the missile’s maximum range exceeds 
5,500 km, the RS-26 is considered an ICBM, though the two-stage Rubezh (based on the 
three-stage RS-24 Yars) appears to have been designed for intermediate range. According 
to Jeffrey Lewis, “the subsequent tests and other information suggest the missile’s real 
165 Michael Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty,” New York Times, January 30, 
2014.  
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range and payload are similar to the SS-20 Saber (known in Russian as the RDS-10 
Pioneer)—the weapon that was the whole reason for negotiating an INF ban in the first 
place.”171 In terms of an actual violation, however, there seems to be little supporting 
evidence. 
2. Potential Withdrawal from the INF Treaty 
In spite of the possible political motivations for the United States to declare that 
Russia is violating the INF Treaty, Russian actions are suspiciously like those of a 
country that would rather not be bound by its treaty obligations. Lewis states that “Russia 
has long sought to get out of the 1987 agreement,”172 yet Russia remains a party to the 
treaty. According to Nikolai Sokov and Miles Pomper, “if Moscow decides the INF 
Treaty is in the way of R&D programs it considers vital, it will hardly hesitate to 
withdraw.”173 Threatening to pull out of the treaty may be a way of attempting to 
exercise political leverage. Russia could easily withdraw from the INF Treaty in 
accordance with the withdrawal procedures outlined in Article XV: “Each Party shall, in 
exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it 
decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have 
jeopardized its supreme interests.”174 Russia could claim that United States BMD efforts, 
among other concerns, endanger its interests. It could also mitigate some of the backlash 
by citing the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as a precedent if necessary. 
However, there would likely still be political repercussions if Russia withdrew. Backing 
out of this landmark agreement would, at the very least, be damaging to Russia’s prestige 
and further alienate Russia from the West. 
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3. Justifications for Noncompliance 
Despite constant Russian rhetoric about the United States attempting to upset 
strategic stability, the Kremlin appears to be engaging in such behavior through 
noncompliance with its arms control agreements. Russian officials may regard cheating 
as a justifiable and necessary response to reestablish the strategic balance that the United 
States is supposedly upsetting by deploying its missile defenses in partnership with 
NATO. The testing of the RS-26 Rubezh and the alleged launch of the Iskander R-500 at 
intermediate range are the two notable examples. Although Russian violations of the INF 
Treaty are denied by Russian officials, “Russia’s two new missiles offer Moscow 
precisely the sort of intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles that the INF Treaty 
was intended to prohibit.”175 Since Russia is already acting contrary to the spirit of the 
treaty, one would suspect that it might as well pull out of this accord with which it clearly 
disagrees. However, it would appear that Russia believes that it still has something to 
gain by remaining a party to the treaty. Russia will likely continue to evade these arms 
control provisions until either it can succeed in limiting U.S. missile defenses, or the 
United States starts seriously addressing Russian noncompliance by taking action beyond 
official condemnations. 
G. RUSSIAN NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal is another tool that Russia could use to increase 
its political clout in future treaties. Podvig suggests that Russia uses the uncertainty 
surrounding its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons as an instrument for political 
leverage.176 The Russians did not have to give up anything significant due to the New 
START Treaty—nothing that was not already going to be eliminated. The only category 
of nuclear weapons in which Russia has a vast numerical advantage is tactical nuclear 
weapons, and, as Keith Payne notes, “the Russians apparently were adamant about 
175 Lewis, “Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.” 
176 Podvig, “Russia’s Nuclear Forces,” 22. 
49 
 
                                                 
excluding tactical nuclear weapons from New START.”177 Although the exact number of 
Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons is unknown, various estimates place that number in the 
range of 2,000 to 4,000, and it is widely agreed that Russian stockpiles vastly outnumber 
American nonstrategic nuclear forces.178 The numerical disparity increases Russian 
bargaining capacity, increasing leverage in any future treaty or negotiation in which these 
weapons are on the table. A statement from Russia’s lower house of the Federal 
Assembly, the Duma, is a further affirmation of these weapons as bargaining tools: 
“Possible reductions and limitations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons [tactical nuclear 
weapons] should be considered in conjunction with other problems in the sphere of arms 
control, including deployment of missile defense systems”179 The United States Senate 
wrote that the United States would seek “negotiations with the Russian Federation on an 
agreement to address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons 
stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United States.”180 Saunders, Rowberry, and 
Fearey have suggested that Moscow could try to use any American desires for reductions 
in Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons by demanding the removal of U.S. NSNW from 
NATO European territory, more concessions on missile defense, or even limiting U.S. 
conventional capabilities.181 Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal is another example of how 
nuclear weapons fulfill political purposes in Russia’s foreign policy.  
Russia’s nuclear weapons play multiple roles: they serve as a strategic deterrent, 
act as symbols of Russia’s status, and function as bargaining chips in nuclear arms 
control agreements. Threat perceptions shape Russia’s deterrent framework, which in 
turn affects Russian decision-making on nuclear arms control. From a realist standpoint, 
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Russia is attempting to alter the status quo, or at the very least prevent the balance from 
shifting further in the United States’ favor. Russia wants to limit U.S. capabilities in 
legally binding agreements, but it selectively abides by these agreements itself. Whether 
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IV. ASSESSMENTS OF RUSSIAN RATIONALITY 
Thus, far, Russia’s strategy in strategic missile defense and nuclear arms control 
has involved seeking limits on U.S.-led missile defenses, preserving nuclear parity, 
pursuing political concessions, and maintaining national prestige. Russia consistently 
uses the perceived threat to its nuclear deterrent as a way to gain concessions. Russia’s 
concerns can be summarized in three statements: in Moscow’s view, the U.S.-led BMD 
programs can neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability, these programs upset 
strategic stability, and future U.S. BMD capabilities will cause further problems for 
Russia’s nuclear deterrent and strategic stability. This raises an important question: are 
these genuine and objectively rational fears, or are these feigned fears used as instruments 
of manipulation? To answer this question, one must examine Moscow’s official 
statements in the context of Russia’s interactions with the United States. This illustrates 
the importance of relative power calculation, a fundamental realist concern. 
Mearsheimer’s two aspects of power, military and latent power, offer a compelling 
template in this instance. Russian behavior should be influenced by the country’s relative 
military and economic capabilities. Since “the concept of power is always a relative 
one,”182 one must look at Russian behavior in light of U.S. missile defense capabilities. 
A. REVIEW OF CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENTS  
In the Russian national security debate over strategic armaments, Russia’s 
political and military planners focus on the capabilities of the United States. The thought 
process, according to Nikolai Sokov, is that “if Russia could deter the United States, it 
could deter any other state or coalition of states.”183 Moscow, therefore, looks at its own 
defense policies through the prism of Washington’s defense policies. In Pavel Podvig’s 
words, “Strategic stability and approximate parity with the United States in the 
composition and capabilities of nuclear forces are very important concepts in the 
182 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 143. 
183 Sokov, “Why do States Rely on Nuclear Weapons?” 102.  
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domestic Russian security debate, so any U.S. policy that influences these two issues has 
a significant effect on Russia.”184 Since Russia fears U.S. technical capabilities, one must 
take a capabilities-based approach to analyzing the validity of Russia’s concerns. 
1. The European Phased Adaptive Approach 
Since the cancellation in March 2013 of its last phase, the European Phased 
Adaptive Approach has three phases in its currently planned form. The first phase, 
deployed in 2011, consists of Aegis ships with Standard Missile-3 Block IA interceptors 
(SM-3) in the Mediterranean Sea, a radar based in Turkey, and a command-and-control 
center in Germany. This first phase was designed to address short and medium-range 
ballistic missile threats. The second phase, scheduled for deployment in 2015, will add 
Aegis Ashore in Romania with a more advanced interceptor—the SM-3 Block IB. Aegis 
Ashore is a land-based BMD component that utilizes capabilities from the Aegis ships. 
Phase two was also designed to combat short and medium-range missile threats. Phase 
three, slated for deployment in 2018, will add Aegis Ashore in Poland with a more 
advanced interceptor (SM-3 Block IIA) to protect against medium and intermediate-range 
threats. Potentially, the United States could add Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) batteries in support of the EPAA.185  
2. Could U.S.-led BMD Programs Neutralize Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal? 
Numerous experts have argued against the claim that U.S. missile defenses could 
adversely affect Russia’s nuclear deterrent. In reviewing the works of these experts, it is 
important to note the difficulty in relying on open source material to accurately assess 
military capacity. These studies probably illustrate a close, yet most likely not entirely 
accurate, representation of U.S. and Russian technical capabilities. With that caveat in 
mind, Dean Wilkening analyzes the rationality of Russian fears of U.S. BMD based on 
U.S. and Russian military capabilities. He measures the effectiveness of missile defense 
184 Podvig, “Instrumental Influences,” 40–41. 
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based on four criteria: the area it can protect, the probability of destroying a warhead (a 
product of identifying the target among decoys and the probability of destroying the 
correct target), the ability to survive attacks while functioning effectively, and the size of 
the system (relative to the adversary’s arsenal).186 A failure in one of these areas means 
the BMD system will be ineffective. 
(1) Missile Overload 
Wilkening describes how the proposed U.S. BMD program would likely fail in 
these areas. The size of the proposed missile defense system is an oft cited example of 
how easily Russia could overcome U.S. defenses. Relative to Russia’s vast nuclear 
arsenal, the few dozen interceptors of the EPAA would not protect against the simple 
overload of missiles. Kristensen and Norris estimated that as of March 2013, Russia has 
about 313 ICBMs with 976 warheads out of a total of 1,600 deployed strategic 
warheads.187 There is a remote possibility of future deployments of hundreds of missile 
interceptors that could decrease this numerical advantage, especially in the hypothetical 
case of a preemptive U.S. assault taking out a large fraction of Russian ICBMs, but this is 
a highly unlikely scenario.188 
(2) Preemptive Strikes 
Wilkening also suggests that Russia could preemptively attack the U.S. BMD 
system in a possible future conflict, as Russian officials have threatened in the past.189 
Although missile defense systems are designed to defend themselves, “the current 
Russian nuclear programs aim to overcome or even neutralize U.S. missile defenses.”190 
At an international conference on missile defense in Moscow, General Nikolai Makarov, 
then the Chief of the General Staff, stated that Russia would have to take adequate 
186 Dean A. Wilkening, “Does Missile Defence in Europe Threaten Russia?” Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy 54, no. 1 (2012): 33, doi: 10.1080/00396338.2012.657531. 
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countermeasures as the danger from U.S. and NATO missile defenses increases, such as 
increasing the capabilities of Russian missiles to penetrate missile defenses, placing 
additional strike weapons in the south and northwest of Russia, and the deployment of 
Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region.191 This calls into question the ability of the 
proposed U.S. missile defense sites to function effectively, should they be attacked. A 
preemptive attack on these facilities would guarantee a war with the United States, so this 
scenario, however absurd and improbable, is purely hypothetical.  
(3) Countermeasures 
Determining the effectiveness of Russian countermeasures to decrease the 
probability of U.S. interceptors destroying a warhead is more difficult to assess. As 
Wilkening states, “decoy effectiveness depends on technical details of the missile-
defense architecture and the signatures associated with an opponent’s warheads and 
decoys, neither of which are available in the open literature.”192 Russia reportedly plans 
to improve its countermeasures and penetration aids on its nuclear missiles,193 and 
missile defense tests are difficult enough without having to deal with decoys. These 
general conclusions suggest that the U.S.-led BMD efforts in Europe could not possibly 
affect Russia’s nuclear deterrent without serious modifications to the system. 
(4) Footprints 
For the area criterion, Wilkening analyzes hypothetical launches by examining the 
area the interceptors can cover, known as a BMD footprint, along with sensor 
information, and assuming an approximate speed of 5.0 km/s for U.S. interceptors. 
Wilkening chooses 5.0 km/s because “this turns out to be the speed below which SM-3-
like interceptors have little ability to intercept Russian strategic missiles.”194 In terms of 
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tracking, Wilkening uses the U.S. upgraded early-warning radars (UEWRs) because they 
constitute “the only sensor architecture that currently can track Russian ICBMs at long 
ranges.”195 However, this is all a hypothetical argument because “UEWR track data is 
not sufficiently accurate to provide a fire-control solution for any SM-3 interceptor.”196 
With all his assumptions and caveats in mind, Wilkening concludes that interceptors 
launched from Poland or the Baltic Sea against various Russian ICBMs on a minimum 
energy or lofted trajectory would have almost no capacity to prevent a missile from 
striking the United States. Even if it were possible to obtain a fire control solution during 
the boost phase, an interceptor from Europe launched against a Russian ICBM forty 
seconds before burnout could only theoretically intercept a missile aimed at the eastern 
United States. Russia has no reason to fear an upset in strategic stability from European-
based U.S missile defenses. However, intercepts could become increasingly effective as 
defenses are moved closer to the United States.  
3. U.S. BMD Ineffective against Russian ICBMs 
Past studies and U.S. government agency reports support Wilkening’s analysis. 
For example, Philip Coyle and Victoria Samson highlight the inefficacy of U.S. missile 
defenses. They argue that U.S. BMD could not possibly hinder a Russian nuclear assault: 
“Given the large number of Russian ICBMs, even the most futuristic missile defenses 
would not be dependable against a Russian attack.”197 As of 2008, Coyle and Samson 
write, the United States had a poor test record of only 7 successes out of 13 attempted 
intercepts, and it had information about trajectories that no adversary would provide. In 
1999, balloons were used as decoys but proved extremely challenging, so they were later 
phased out of the program. Coyle and Samson argue that the tests were not operationally 
realistic, and until they are, interceptors will continue to be ineffective against advanced 
countermeasures.198  
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In a technical overview prepared by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) for 
a conference in Moscow, Rear Admiral Randall Hendrickson, then the Deputy Director 
of the MDA, explained that it is infeasible for an SM-3 to intercept a Russian ICBM. 
Russian ICBMs are too fast and have too great a range, while the SM-3 is launched too 
late and is positioned in the wrong geographic location. In Hendrickson’s words, 
“Russian ICBMs launched towards [the] U.S. travel on Polar trajectories and are too fast 
for deployed SM-3 to intercept either [the] ICBM itself or reentry vehicle.”199 The 
interceptors would have to chase the ICBM. Additionally, according to the report, 
interceptors would not be launched until after ICBM burnout due to limited sensor 
capabilities: “Intercept is not possible during boost phase [with the SM-3] due to 
unobtainable fire control solution.”200 The report asserts that the SM-3 would not even be 
launched until one to three minutes after ICBM burnout occurs, a fact that supports 
Wilkening’s analysis. Wilkening based his calculations on an interceptor launch at 
burnout or forty seconds earlier, and the SM-3 still could not achieve an intercept. The 
U.S. Missile Defense Agency report concludes that the EPAA is not directed against 
Russia, and that the EPAA is incapable of intercepting Russian ICBMs or SLBMs. 
4. Possibility of Boost-Phase Intercept 
There has been much debate over the feasibility of a boost-phase intercept (BPI). 
Richard Garwin suggests that BPI is preferable to a mid-course intercept due to its 
inherent advantages.201 Others, however, assert that developing a boost-phase intercept 
capability is impractical. A 2012 report from the National Research Council concludes 
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that BPI is not “practical or feasible”202 and is limited by “the concept of operations 
(CONOPS), policy, time, and geography.”203 This type of intercept is theoretically 
possible, but a boost-phase intercept using the SM-3 interceptors against Russia’s nuclear 
arsenal appears to be infeasible. Although intercept during the boost-phase of a missile’s 
trajectory would circumvent the challenge of dealing with countermeasures and make 
identifying the target easier due to its bright infrared signature, the time to engage the 
missile is far too short for an intercept to be practical. The report also acknowledges that 
“boost-phase systems are only effective against countries that do not have large enough 
landmasses to allow them to launch missiles from deep within their territory.”204 This 
vulnerability clearly does not apply to Russia, given its vast geographic extent. The 
components of the EPAA would probably be positioned too far away to reach a Russian 
ICBM with the SM-3’s current velocity. 
5. Ground Based Interceptors 
Various Russian defense experts also admit that U.S. BMD programs cannot 
undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. These experts assert that the interception of 
one Russian missile would require ten Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs), thus making 
interception “absolutely irrational.”205 The United States currently has four interceptors 
at Vandenberg AFB in California, and 26 interceptors at Ft. Greely in Alaska. In 2013, 
following the cancellation of phase 4 of the EPAA, the Obama administration announced 
a plan to add fourteen more interceptors in Alaska.206 The United States would require 
hundreds or even thousands of these missiles to have a chance at effectively negating 
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Russia’s deterrent. In a 2011 report, a group of Russian defense specialists also stated that 
the proposed phases of the EPAA could only have a limited impact on Russia’s strategic 
nuclear arsenal, even before the last phase was cancelled.207 Russian nuclear forces could 
easily overwhelm U.S. missile defenses. 
B. ASSESSMENTS OF POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO STRATEGIC 
STABILITY 
Russia’s second major complaint concerns the conceivable damage to strategic 
stability and the balance of capabilities. Russia has often stated that it cannot participate 
in further nuclear arms reductions in light of U.S. missile defense efforts and advances in 
precision guided munitions. The importance Russia places on this balance is paramount. 
Vladimir Putin once stated that it is, in fact, Russia’s global responsibility to preserve the 
strategic balance: “Our national task—not just our national task even, but our 
responsibility to humankind—is to preserve the balance of strategic forces and 
capabilities.”208 One of the problems in evaluating potential damage to strategic stability 
is that analyses of the issue are highly speculative and depend on a variety of volatile 
factors. One of the crucial assumptions in some analyses is that the United States and 
Russia will participate in further nuclear reductions—an uncertain outcome in the current 
political context. 
1. Risks of “Low Numbers” of Nuclear Weapons 
David Yost examines the risks associated with further reductions in nuclear 
weapons, specifically, in reductions that result in fewer than 1,000 operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian stockpiles. He analyzes the potential 
risks to strategic stability, defined as “a situation in which there is a low probability of 
major-power war.”209 Although another major-power war appears improbable for the 
foreseeable future, other security issues could arise in the wake of further nuclear 
207 Trubnikov et al., “Problems and Prospects,” 18. 
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reductions. While “some allied observers perceive no risks in such reductions,”210 Russia 
believes that fewer operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, especially in the 
presence of effective U.S. missile defenses, would undermine strategic stability.          
Yost discusses three of the potential security implications of low numbers of U.S. 
and Russian strategic nuclear weapons: the increased gravity of treaty noncompliance, the 
greater temptation for preemptive strikes, and the expanded risk of nuclear proliferation. 
Yost notes that the effects of cheating and noncompliance at lower numbers would be 
amplified.211 There have already been Russian compliance issues with the INF Treaty, 
and numerical disparities could become more pronounced if nuclear weapons were cut 
back. Additionally, Yost notes that “some European observers said that moving to 
significantly smaller nuclear force postures could tempt adversaries to consider first 
strike or preemption strategies or to adopt launch-on-warning postures that could 
undermine extended deterrence and strategic stability.”212 Russia also fears that reduced 
nuclear forces would be “more vulnerable to preemptive attacks and strategic 
defenses.”213 A greater number of nuclear weapons could be considered Russia’s 
deterrent guarantee while also maintaining the ability to overwhelm strategic missile 
defenses. In terms of nuclear proliferation, if U.S. allies questioned the credibility of U.S. 
extended deterrence, those nations might seek to obtain their own national nuclear 
arsenals.214 Russia would not favor any situation in which a reduction in strategic 
stability corresponded to a reduction in Russia’s security. 
2. Stability with Missile Defenses 
Bruce Blair and four other scholars conducted a study to assess the effects of 
reduced nuclear forces with limited missile defenses on nuclear deterrence between the 
United States and Russia. This study takes a statistical and quantitative approach to 
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evaluating deterrent stability, defined as “a situation where both the United States and 
Russia would not rationally choose to strike first with nuclear weapons.”215 The study 
concludes that “stable deterrence based on the mutual vulnerability of U.S. and Russian 
urban centers can exist with relatively low numbers of strategic forces,” even with missile 
defenses and conventional strikes.216 Based on the results of this study, Russia should not 
fear that further reductions in nuclear weapons would undermine strategic stability or 
Russia’s nuclear deterrent capacity, even in the presence of U.S. missile defenses. 
These scenarios are based on the assumption of further arms reduction treaties 
such as the New START Treaty. Without any further nuclear weapons reductions, 
increasingly capable missile defenses still appear to pose a minimal, or even no, threat to 
overall strategic stability. According to Blair and his co-authors, even with fewer nuclear 
weapons and missile defenses, Russia should not fear greater instability. However, as 
Yost highlights, fewer U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons could in some circumstances 
pose several risks to strategic stability. Russia’s fear that U.S.-led missile defense efforts 
could undercut strategic stability appears to be unjustified, but there could be problems 
for strategic stability in the wake of future nuclear weapons reductions. Consequently, it 
is likely that the Russians will continue to resist additional rounds of nuclear 
disarmament. 
C. FEARS OF FUTURE CAPABILITIES 
In sum, from a technical perspective, current and planned U.S.-led BMD 
programs do not threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent or undermine strategic stability. 
Russian fears, as stated by various Russian government officials, politicians, and military 
leaders, are irrational in the context of current and foreseeable U.S. military capabilities. 
However, another common argument is that Russia fears future U.S. capabilities. 
Although numerous experts from a variety of backgrounds have concluded that the U.S. 
215 Bruce Blair et al., “One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and 
Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses,” Science 
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BMD system cannot, in its current and prospective form, negate Russia’s nuclear 
deterrent, who is to say that the United States could not augment the system several 
decades from now? Russia, in response, would have to increase its own military spending 
to improve and expand its arsenal. The Russians may fear a possible arms race, in view of 
their relatively weak economic position compared to that of the United States.217 Every 
state faces budgetary constraints, and Russia is no exception. 
1. Defense Spending Comparison 
As Russia seeks to modernize its aging nuclear arsenal, it will only be able to 
accomplish what it can pay for. It costs billions of dollars to modernize, improve, and 
expand nuclear arsenals. Every state’s nuclear strategy is ultimately limited by the 
resources it can allocate from its defense budget. Vladimir Putin stated that Russia has 
“earmarked 23 trillion rubles [approximately 643 billion dollars] for the development, 
upgrading and technical re-equipment of the army, and the modernization of our defence 
industry.”218 Putin added that “we have strained ourselves to the limit to come up with 
these funds.”219 Increasing defense budgets place significant strains on a country’s 
economy. In terms of relative economic position, the United States greatly outpaces 
Russia. Russia’s GDP in 2012 was approximately $2.01 trillion compared to the $16.24 
trillion of the United States.220 There is a similar disparity in defense spending. In 2012, 
Russia spent approximately $81 billion221 on defense following a huge increase in 
defense spending in 2011, of which 10% went to Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces.222 
This is dwarfed by the United States’ base defense budget, which totaled approximately 
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$530.6 billion in 2012.223 The United States has also spent a large amount on missile 
defense—$9.7 billion in 2013.224 Washington plans to spend $47.4 billion on missile 
defense in 2013–2017.225 Although it is impossible to predict future capabilities, Russia 
may worry that the economic gap between the United States and Russia will only 
increase, leading to a larger capabilities gap.  
2. The Gaps 
The economic gap is clearly visible, and Russians acknowledge that there is 
already a noticeable capabilities gap. For instance, in 2012 Vladimir Putin stated, “we see 
how technology is developing. Our partners really are ahead of us, especially in high 
precision weaponry.”226 Moving forward, an abundance of limited resources will be used 
by Russia on its defense modernization efforts and by the United States on its missile 
defense programs. Although the exact cost estimates have not been finalized, the United 
States Department of Defense estimates that continuing operational and support costs 
may exceed several billion dollars for some components of the EPAA, and a United 
States Government Accountability Office report suggests that the total cost will, in fact, 
be greater since the DOD does not include all BMD elements.227 Although the long term 
costs for deploying and maintaining the components of the EPAA will be substantial, the 
United States has the economic capacity to maintain these expenditures. Over the past 
two years, Russia has experienced slow economic growth: a devaluating ruble, a decline 
in the rate of growth for real GDP, and weak industrial production.228 Russia is in a 
declining relative economic position for its military modernization efforts. 
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Based on various arguments derived from the realist family of theories, Russia 
should not rationally fear that any current U.S. BMD program could negate its nuclear 
deterrent or undermine strategic stability. Russia could, however, reasonably fear that 
U.S. capabilities in the distant future might affect its nuclear deterrent because the 
economic disparity between the two countries, in both GDP and defense spending, is so 
great. Without being directly involved in Moscow’s strategic planning, it is difficult to 
determine the exact rationale for Russian behavior. One possible explanation is that 
Russia is seeking political concessions now due to its fear of future U.S. missile defense 
prospects. Russia could also fear that further rounds of nuclear disarmament could 
endanger Russia’s survival by creating an unstable security environment dominated by 
nonnuclear capabilities. Additionally, Russian officials would probably not readily admit 
that they are behind the economic curve, and that, as the gap widens, Russia will be in a 
poor negotiating position.  
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Russian behavior regarding strategic missile defense and nuclear arms control is a 
case study of the broader phenomenon of realism in international politics. The analytical 
framework that shapes Russia decision-making consists of realist principles such as the 
anarchic state of the international system, the importance of relative power calculations, 
and the competition for state survival and aggrandizement. Russia strives to maximize its 
share of power in the world, and various Russian elites assert that Russia remains one of 
the “great powers.” Although one could perform analyses of Russian activities in 
strategic missile defense and nuclear arms control based on other theories of international 
relations, the explanations are clearest and most persuasive when the situation is viewed 
through a realist lens. 
A. A REALIST INTERPRETATION 
The assumptions derived from realist theories aptly explain Russia’s behavior in 
strategic missile defense and nuclear arms control. Russian policymakers are concerned 
with the balance of power and how its interactions with the United States and other 
NATO countries affect its security and international status. Russian officials have stated 
that U.S. and NATO missile defense programs threaten Russia’s security, but the actual 
Russian motivations appear to be aligned with Robert Zadra’s observation: “the real 
Russian concerns had more to do with Moscow’s assessment of American global 
ambitions and strategic superiority.”229 U.S.-led BMD programs complicate the pursuit 
of Russia’s ambitions. The European Phased Adaptive Approach, in particular, could be 
seen as a future threat to Russia’s status and influence, if not its survival, so Russia uses 
any means necessary to sway its geopolitical rivals and to further Russia’s foreign and 
security policy interests.  
Russia’s nuclear weapons are also a means to accomplish its great power 
ambitions. Russia’s strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals provide a deterrent against 
229 Zadra, “NATO, Russia and Missile Defence,” 54. 
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aggression, serve as symbols of Russia’s status, and function as bargaining chips in 
nuclear arms control agreements. The perceived threats from the United States and its 
NATO allies (as well as China) shape Russia’s deterrent framework, which in turn affects 
Russian decision-making on nuclear arms control. Through arms control agreements, 
Moscow seeks to legally bind U.S. capabilities, but Russia will bypass certain provisions 
when it is deemed necessary. From a realist point of view, Russia is attempting to alter 
the status quo and, at the very least, prevent the balance of power from shifting any 
further in favor of the United States. 
Russian statements that U.S.-led BMD programs threaten Russian security or the 
strategic balance are excessive and ill-founded in the context of current and prospective 
U.S. military capabilities. Russia uses the supposed U.S. “threats” to its national security 
and strategic stability as a means to seek political concessions. The situation in the distant 
future, however, may be more complicated. The United States could hypothetically 
augment its BMD systems over decades with hundreds of capable interceptors to the 
point where it could actually threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent—if Moscow behaved 
with uncharacteristic passivity in its force modernization. In terms of latent power, 
moreover, Russia’s relative economic position compared to that of the United States 
could place it at a disadvantage, should it need to place added strain on its economy and 
translate its national wealth into military armaments beyond its current modernization 
programs. 
B. PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION 
Future cooperation on strategic missile defense or nuclear arms control between 
Russia and NATO or between Russia and the United States would face severe 
difficulties. Russia and NATO have already put forth several proposals for cooperation 
on BMD, none of which has been successful in creating a joint security architecture. 
From the Russian perspective, NATO proposals do not treat Russia as an equal partner or 
address Russian concerns. Russian proposals, such as the “sectoral” approach to missile 
defense, would place parts of NATO territory under the responsibility of a Russian 
missile defense umbrella, and the Alliance has declined to accept such an arrangement. 
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Russian officials view strategic BMD as an important conditioning factor in 
nuclear arms control. So long as Moscow proclaims that U.S.-led missile defenses 
threaten its nuclear deterrent and undermine strategic stability, Russia will resist 
cooperation on further reductions in its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Moscow will not 
consider additional reductions in nuclear weapons while Russia lags behind in precision 
conventional weapons technology. In 2012, Putin adamantly proclaimed that “we will 
eliminate nuclear weapons only when we have this kind of technology. And not a day 
earlier! No one should have any illusions about that!”230 If Russia were to reconsider its 
position on further reductions in its strategic or nonstrategic nuclear arsenals, it is 
probable that Moscow would require even more concessions, such as legal restrictions on 
strategic BMD capabilities and/or the removal of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons from 
European territory. 
NATO has continued to express interest in missile defense cooperation with 
Russia, but this may not be entirely realistic. NATO consists of twenty-eight separate 
state entities, and each government has its own restrictions on sharing technical 
information. Exchanging technical information among NATO allies can be difficult, but 
sharing sensitive missile defense technology with Russia would face even greater 
obstacles.231 Furthermore, NATO governments may fear that Russia would leak BMD 
intelligence to rogue nations that could use that information to develop countermeasures 
to these missile defense systems.232 A final barrier to BMD cooperation would arise from 
having Russia involved in the BMD command-and-control architecture. With joint 
control of a BMD system, Russia could potentially prevent its use at a critical juncture, 
rendering that system useless. Since the signature of the New START Treaty in April 
2010, productive discussions on strategic missile defense and nuclear arms control have 
been suspended, and future prospects appear bleak. 
230 “Putin Meets with Experts in Sarov,” 




                                                 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO 
Russia’s foreign policy behavior, including its reactions to U.S.-led BMD 
programs and its noncompliance with arms control agreements, has the potential to 
present security risks for NATO, but it also represents a political challenge for the 
Alliance. One security concern involves “rogue states” and the proliferation of ballistic 
missile technology. The U.S. EPAA is meant to combat the ballistic missile threats from 
these states, but in March 2013, Washington cancelled the fourth phase that was meant to 
counter ICBMs in a move that was seen as a concession to Moscow. These rogue nations 
could continue to develop ballistic missile technology to the point of having reliable 
ICBM capabilities. If the United States did not spend the resources to develop and deploy 
interceptors to counter those capabilities in advance, it would increase the threat to both 
Europe and North America. Further restrictions that affect the EPAA’s other phases as 
well could also increase Europe’s vulnerability to future missile strikes. 
A second concern could arise from the Russian noncompliance with the INF 
Treaty, which would enable Russia to threaten European countries with intermediate-
range missiles. The addition of such weapons to Russia’s arsenal would not drastically 
increase the threat to Eastern Europe because these states are already within range of 
Russia’s short-range missiles. If Iskander missiles were stationed in Kaliningrad and the 
range were increased by one to two hundred kilometers, the security environment would 
not fundamentally change.233 Western Europe, however, would see more of a threat 
increase. Since “the elimination of the SS-20 dramatically reduced the threat to Western 
Europe,” the deployment of such intermediate-range weapons would reintroduce that 
threat experienced during the Cold War.234 Although NATO countries would see some 
increased risk, Jeffrey Lewis observes that, ultimately, “a handful of Russian 
intermediate-range nuclear forces do not change the fundamental military balance.”235 
European countries have been vulnerable to nuclear strikes from Moscow since the 
233 Sokov and Pomper, “Is Russia Violating the INF Treaty?” 
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1950s. Russian strategists have, no doubt, considered the potential political-military 
advantages of intermediate-range conventional land-based missiles, in addition to those 
of intermediate-range nuclear forces.  
Russia’s intermediate-range conventional and nuclear forces would present more 
political concerns than become a strategic game changer. Russia has the potential to 
undermine the political unity of the Alliance. Lewis states, “Moscow’s ability to threaten 
capitals throughout NATO represents a challenge to the cohesion of the alliance.”236 A 
resurgent Russia brings up the fundamental concern on NATO’s Article 5 security 
commitments. The Alliance’s new members may worry that Western Europe would not 
risk nuclear war for the sake of one of the Baltic states, for example. Russia is “now more 
willing to flex its muscles,” and has embraced “a neo-imperialistic attitude to an area of 
the world it still regards as its sphere of influence.”237 Moscow’s policies on strategic 
missile defense and nuclear arms control will continue to test NATO’s resolve. 
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